



LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Report title

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## Statement of Assurance 2020 - 21

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Report to

Date

Brigade Portfolio Board	20 September 2021
Commissioner's Board	6 October 2021
Audit Committee	28 October 2021
Fire, Resilience and Emergency Planning Committee	3 February 2022
London Fire Commissioner	

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Report by

Report number

Assistant Commissioner – Transformation	LFC-0602
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I agree the recommended decision below.

**Andy Roe**  
London Fire Commissioner

This report was signed remotely  
Date on the 6 March 2022

### Summary

The London Fire Commissioner (LFC) is required to prepare an annual Statement of Assurance in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework for England. This report presents the LFC's statement for 2020/21.

### Recommended decisions

That the statement (and accompanying information) attached to this report is approved as the LFC's Statement of Assurance for 2020/21.

## **Background**

1. The LFC is required to prepare an annual Statement of Assurance (SoA) in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework for England. The LFC is required to provide annual assurance on financial, governance and operational matters.

## **The Statement**

2. The Statement of Assurance for 2020/21 is attached as Appendix 1 to this report. This also includes an annex which sets out how the Statement meets the requirements of the National Framework, with details about where the evidence can be found.
3. The focus of the Statement submitted for approval is the financial year 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021.

## **Compliance with the National Framework**

4. Section 25 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every two years on:
  - a. the extent to which fire and rescue authorities are acting in accordance with the National Framework (made under section 21 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004); and
  - b. any steps taken by the Secretary for the purpose of securing that fire and rescue authorities act in accordance with the Framework.
5. The Home Office published the last section 25 report to Parliament in July 2020. The report (available [here](#)) concluded:

*"...the Secretary of State is satisfied that every fire and rescue authority in England has acted in accordance with the requirements of the National Framework, and no formal steps have been taken by the Secretary of State since the last assurance statement in 2018 to secure compliance."*

6. This Statement of Assurance provides assurance on operational, governance and financial matters as required by the National Framework. In addition it provides commentary on inspection, intervention and accountability matters.

## **Performance data**

7. Performance data has traditionally accompanied the Brigade's Statement of Assurance. This is provided at Appendix 2 which provides a performance commentary looking back over the last five years. This includes two annexes providing borough data and ward data.
8. The borough and ward data in the annexes is also published in a CSV format on the London Datastore, alongside the regular incident and appliance data from January 2009 onwards.

## **Finance comments**

9. The Chief Finance Officer has reviewed this report and has no comments.

## **Workforce comments**

10. The Statement includes matters which have been the subject of consultation with the Representative Bodies but no specific consultation has been undertaken on this report.

## **Legal comments**

11. In accordance with Part 6A of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 the London Fire Commissioner (the "Commissioner") is established as a corporation sole with the Mayor appointing the occupant of that office. Under section 327D of the GLA Act 1999, the Mayor may issue to the Commissioner specific or general directions as to the manner in which the holder of that office is to exercise his or her functions.
12. Section 1 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 states that the Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for Greater London.
13. When carrying out its functions, the Commissioner, as the fire and rescue authority for Greater London, is required to 'have regard to the Fire and Rescue National Framework (the "Framework") prepared by the Secretary of State (Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, section 21).
14. To have regard does not mean to follow slavishly, if the Commissioner wishes to depart from the framework it may, but it must show a good reason to do so. The Courts have consistently suggested that Government guidance issued under statute, as is the case here, should be given 'great weight' and should be considered 'with great care, and from which it should depart only if it has cogent reasons for doing so'. The reasoning behind any decision to depart from the framework should also be 'spelled out clearly, logically and convincingly' (R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2006] 2 AC 148).
15. The Framework states that 'Every authority must publish an annual statement of assurance of compliance with the Framework'.
16. The attached statement functions as the Commissioner's Statement of Assurance under the Framework.
17. Section 327G of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 states that:
  - 1). This section applies to a document which is prepared and published by the London Fire Commissioner in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework and which—
    - (a) sets out the Commissioner's priorities and objectives, for the period covered by the document, in connection with the discharge of the Commissioner's functions, or
    - (b) contains a statement of the way in which the Commissioner has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any document within paragraph (a) prepared by the Commissioner for that period.
  - 2) The Commissioner must, before publishing the document or any revision to it, send a copy of the document or revision in draft to the Mayor and the Assembly.
  - 3) The Commissioner may not publish the document or any revision to it unless—
    - (a) the Assembly has had an opportunity to review the draft document or revision, and make a report on it to the Mayor, under section 327I(1), and

- (b) the Mayor has approved the draft document or revision.
18. Furthermore, by direction dated 21 March 2018, the Mayor set out those matters, for which the Commissioner would require the prior approval of either the Mayor or the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience (the "Deputy Mayor").
19. Paragraph 1.1 (b) of said direction requires the Commissioner to seek the Mayor's prior "[a] approval of the final proposed text of the draft London Safety Plan (or any revision of it) for the purposes of sending it to the Assembly under section 327G(2) of the GLA Act 1999". Paragraph 6.1 (b) further states that, ""London Safety Plan" refers to any document which is prepared and published by the Commissioner in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework and which contains the matters described in section 327G(1)(a) and/ or (b) of the GLA Act 1999."
20. Paragraph 3.1 of the direction further requires the Commissioner to consult the Deputy Mayor, "as far as practicable in the circumstances before a decision on any of the following is taken: [a] Anything that requires the consent of the Mayor under Part 1 of this Direction."
21. Consequently the Mayoral Direction requires the Commissioner to consult the Deputy Mayor, as far as practicably possible, in advance of seeking the Mayor's approval to send the Statement of Assurance to the Assembly.
22. The Commissioner may not then publish the final Statement of Assurance before the Assembly has had an opportunity to review the draft document or revision, and make a report on it to the Mayor and the Mayor has approved the draft or revision.

### **Sustainability implications**

23. Sustainability forms part of the assurance gathering processes which support the production of the statement.
24. The London Fire Brigade has in place an Environmental Management System certified to ISO 14,001 that covers the management functions of the organisation and a sample of 10 fire stations. This assures the processes in place to monitor compliance with all relevant environmental legislation and continual improvement against environmental impacts.
25. Governance processes require sustainable development impact assessments of all new or amended policies and corporate projects.
26. Governance processes are in place to monitor our procurement activity for compliance with the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 and that of our supply chain for their statutory responsibilities such as modern slavery.

### **Equalities implications**

27. The LFC and decision takers are required to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (s149 of the Equality Act 2010) when taking decisions. This in broad terms involves understanding the potential impact of policy and decisions on different people, taking this into account and then evidencing how decisions were reached.

28. It is important to note that consideration of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not a one-off task. The duty must be fulfilled before taking a decision, at the time of taking a decision, and after the decision has been taken.
29. The protected characteristics are: Age, Disability, Gender reassignment, Pregnancy and maternity, Marriage and civil partnership (but only in respect of the requirements to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination), Race (ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality), Religion or belief (including lack of belief), Sex, Sexual orientation.
30. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires us, in the exercise of all our functions (i.e. everything we do), to have due regard to the need to:
- a. Eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct.
  - b. Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
  - c. Foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
31. Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to:
- a. remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic where those disadvantages are connected to that characteristic;
  - b. take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it (;
  - c. encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.
32. The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include, in particular, steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities.
33. Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—
- a. tackle prejudice, and
  - b. promote understanding.
34. An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) has not been undertaken for this specific report as it is a reflection of existing assurance elements that the LFC has in place to meet the requirements of

the National Framework. However, it does reference content (such as the London Safety Plan) which has been subjected to an EIA.

### List of Appendices

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1.	Statement of Assurance 2020/21	Not protectively marked
2.	Performance data for five years to 2020/21	Not protectively marked

### Appendix 1

## London Fire Commissioner

### STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE 2020/21

#### Foreword by the Commissioner

1. In my foreword to the previous year's statement, I highlighted that it had been a challenging year for the London Fire Brigade in many areas. 2020/21 has been no less challenging but for very different reasons, mainly the emergence and dominance of the COVID-19 global pandemic which has impacted every single aspect of our service.
2. In my view the response of all our staff to an unprecedented national crisis has been outstanding. As well as dealing with difficult individual challenges brought on by the pandemic including but not limited to mental health, our staff have continued to deliver and come up with innovative ways to meet our objectives. Not only that, but we have successfully supported our colleagues in the London Ambulance Service (LAS) during the pandemic through our Ambulance Driver Assist (ADA) programme to help mitigate the exceptional demands on the LAS.
3. I would like to reassure Londoners that we will continue to provide an effective service to London and further support to our partners where necessary. We have robust contingency plans in place to maintain our response, despite the challenges COVID-19 may present.
4. As well as the pandemic, we have continued to deliver on the important improvement actions identified in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry improvement plan, Her Majesty's Inspectorate for Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services action plan, and the Transformation Delivery Plan. I am pleased to report that good progress has been made on these actions but we will keep working to secure a Brigade that is continually improving, delivering a service fit for London now and in the future to meet our mission statement, "*trusted to serve and protect.*"

**Andy Roe, London Fire Commissioner**

## **Introduction**

5. The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England sets out a requirement for fire and rescue authorities to provide an annual Statement of Assurance, providing assurance to communities and government on financial, governance and operational matters.
6. The purpose of this Statement is to satisfy the requirement to produce an annual statement under the National Framework. The Statement also provides assurance against the Framework, and to the communities of London and government, with respect to the areas highlighted above for the 2020/21 financial year.
7. The focus of this Statement is the year 1 April 2020 to 31 March 2021.

## **Operational Assurance**

8. The National Framework outlines the requirements for fire and rescue authorities to provide assurance on operational matters.
9. Fire and rescue authorities operate within a clearly defined statutory and policy framework. The key documents defining operational responsibilities for LFC are the:
  - Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;
  - Civil Contingencies Act 2004;
  - Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005;
  - Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007;
  - Localism Act 2011;
  - Policing and Crime Act 2017; and
  - Fire and Rescue National Framework for England 2018.

## **Integrated Risk Management Plan (London Safety Plan)**

10. The Fire and Rescue National Framework sets out the requirement that each fire and rescue authority must produce an Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate.
11. The requirement for an IRMP in London is delivered through the LFC's London Safety Plan ([here](#)) and sets out the LFC's plans for improvement in services to address the risks facing Londoners, together with the management arrangements required to implement them.
12. Each London Safety Plan (LSP) is supported by a risk based approach to planning emergency cover for London. The approach taken for the current Plan (i.e. the Plan in place for the period covered by this statement) was incorporated into the London Safety Plan under the 'Risk in London' section.
13. A number of considerations make up the Brigade's approach when deciding how to provide its service. This includes:-
  - the principle of equal entitlement;

- an understanding of risk in London based on the likelihood of an incident occurring and its consequences;
  - the full range of incident types that the Brigade attends;
  - incident trends;
  - assessment of local risk;
  - targeting people at risk; and
  - London's demography.
14. The LSP in place for the period covered by this statement was approved by the former London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority on 30 March 2017 (*and adopted as the extant plan for the LFC on 1 April 2018*) and was developed to cover the period from 2017 to 2021. However, the impact of CoVID-19 has led to an extension being agreed by the Mayor of London. An inclusive approach was taken to the development of the Plan incorporating the ideas, views and contributions from as many people as possible. Details of the public consultation undertaken can be found in the covering report to the Plan (*FEP2723*). Key performance indicators and targets are included in the LSP.
- Performance outcomes in 2020/21**
15. Key performance indicators and targets are agreed as part of the London Safety Plan and are reviewed on an annual basis. All key LSP targets and commitments, as well as key projects, were subject to scrutiny and monitoring by the Commissioner's Board.
16. The LFC refreshed its targets for 2020/21 as part of the current London Safety Plan (LSP2017). This information is available online in the annual end of year performance report on the London Fire website under 'Information we publish' (via the following link <https://www.londonfire.gov.uk/about-us/transparency/information-we-publish/>). Commentaries against performance can also be found in the performance reports to the Commissioner's Board.
17. Overall, performance, and safety outcomes for Londoners, for 2020/21 reveals that the majority of indicators set as part of the London Safety Plan are meeting the targets set.
- Operational competence**
18. The LFC has a statutory duty to ensure that all operational staff were trained to undertake their roles effectively and safely. Training requirements for operational staff include a number of generic core risk critical skills that all staff must develop and maintain. These core skills are set out in a formal Brigade policy - "developing and maintaining operational professionalism" (DaMOP).
19. DaMOP ensures that there is training across a range of core competencies relevant to role – including station based, specialist roles, senior managers and strategic officers. There are both theoretical and practical requirements set out in each level, which enable staff to maintain their core competencies by continually developing and improving their knowledge, skills and understanding. All DaMOP training is mandatory.
20. Training within the Brigade is divided into two main areas:
- *Acquisition of skills training* – The initial learning phase. The Brigade's external training provider is responsible for acquisition of skills training. This includes the training of newly

appointed firefighters as well as the development of new skills for more experienced staff undertaking new or modified roles; and

- *Maintenance of skills training* - Once the initial acquisition of skills training has taken place, it will be necessary for staff to practise their skills, knowledge and understanding, in conjunction with, and in addition to, their existing skills, knowledge and understanding. This 'practice' is what is referred to as maintenance of skills training.

21. The Brigade's Operational Improvement Process (OIP) is in place to support the maintenance of operational competence. The OIP identifies and responds to risk-critical issues that have the potential to affect operational performance (and staff). The process monitors operational and training performance, identifying developmental trends and provides mechanisms, including the implementation of training interventions to support operational staff.
22. At the heart of the process is effective information gathering which allows crews, monitoring officers and specialist officers, to record and identify developmental trends arising from incidents and training events. Information is recorded that describes individual and team performance and captures the issues related to training, equipment and procedures. The Operational Professionalism Board, chaired by the Assistant Commissioner for Operational Policy, receives regular reports summarising the information gathered, and makes decisions about changes to and new training interventions, as well as communication/awareness via the Operational News internal publication.
23. OIP is linked to DaMOP which sets out what is required to enable staff at stations to maintain their professionalism by continually developing their skills, knowledge and understanding. The OIP is closely aligned to the requirements of "HSG 65 - Successful Health and Safety Management" produced by the Health and Safety Executive.
24. During 2020/21, the implementation of the revised DaMOP framework for station based staff, as well as mid and end cycle reviews of the revised framework were completed. The reviews noted a number of recommendations for enhancements, which have now begun to be implemented.
25. Phase 2 for senior managers (Station Commanders and Group Commanders) and specialist roles was implemented successfully during July 2020. To ensure that there is continuous improvement of DaMOP for senior managers and specialist staff a review of the initial 12 months of the 24 month programme will be initiated to ensure continuous improvements.
26. A third phase will begin in the new financial year. Phase 3 is for strategic officers (Deputy Assistant Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners). Workshops have been held with the strategic officers to understand their training needs to be able to support their core competencies.
27. During the Covid-19 pandemic all DaMOP training was able to be maintained as it is all station based or delivered in rota groups.
28. In addition to DaMOP developments, a review of the Brigade's training commissioning process is also underway. Training Commissioning and Design have been working closely with the Brigade's training provider to streamline the current course design process from conception of a

training request from a commissioning department to the completion of sign off of the training content. The benefits of which will be seen in the coming financial year.

29. The new TCAP process will also be looking at innovative ways for our training interventions which will provide our staff with engaging and immersive training experience.

### **High rise training**

30. The Brigade has taken steps to update a number of policies with regard to high rise firefighting during 2020/21 including Fire Survival Guidance (PN790); High Rise Firefighting (PN633) and a new Evacuation and Rescue Policy (PN970). There has also been a focus on the training delivery requirements of the new policies to ensure that our staff are appropriately trained and equipped to respond competently and confidently to incidents in the high rise built environment in London.
31. A initial computer based training package on fire survival guidance for operational staff has been completed by 89 per cent of station based staff as at the end of March 2021. This will be supplemented by a further 'phase 2' step which will commence in April 2021 to embed understanding and will include a fire survival guidance exercise and walk / talk through high rise attendance and evacuation actions at a local premises. It is anticipated that this will have been delivered to all watches by the end of autumn 2021. The packages will then be made available for local watch training and delivered as part of the DaMOP framework for all 3 levels of operational staff (station based, senior managers and strategic officers).

### **Safety**

32. Matters of operational competence and firefighter safety are reported regularly to the Commissioner's Board through standard performance reports. This includes trend reporting on health and safety events (RIDDORs and operational injuries), and road traffic collisions. An annual health and safety report was also provided to the Board in July 2020 providing a full overview of performance against key health and safety indicators (a half yearly report is also provided). This included preventative initiatives and interventions, premises audits, occupational health, and safety consultation.
33. The number of safety events reported under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases, and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (RIDDOR) first dipped below 100 events five years ago (in 2015/16). These events are those more serious events required to be reported to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), under RIDDOR. The figure for 2020/21 of 51 RIDDOR reportable injuries is a decrease over the figure reported for 2019/20 (56) and is a significant improvement over the high point of the last five years (93 in 2016/17). As part of the London Safety Plan (2017), officers brought in targets/ context measures to specifically monitor key safety areas. This includes injuries on the incident ground and injuries to members of the public through road traffic collisions with Brigade vehicles.
34. The operational policy framework and wider safety systems in place mean that the Brigade tends not to have many serious injuries (i.e. we have very few 'specified' injuries under RIDDOR) and the incidents continue to mainly relate to slips and trips and the moving and handling of operational equipment or casualties (as in previous years). A focus of improvement in 2020/21 has been through developing safety leadership, which is pivotal to effective health and safety management. Specific behaviours focussing on health, safety and wellbeing have been included in the behavioural framework. This is supported through individual risk

management objectives and the concept of safety leadership is included in broader leadership development.

### **Fire safety**

35. In addition to the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review Team (GTIRT), the Brigade's specialist fire safety teams have had an unprecedented level of engagement with the fire sector, standards bodies and government since the Grenfell Tower fire. The Brigade continues to provide its unique expertise to drive evidence based change in the built environment where appropriate.
36. Brigade officers seconded into the Home Office via National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) are continuing to assist with the developing changes to the regulatory regime recommended by Dame Judith Hackitt and supporting a review of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (FSO). Brigade officers are also working to ensure that protecting the most vulnerable in our communities, whilst protecting firefighters during their operations is at the heart of the new regulatory regime. Part of this national work includes the development of national guidance and/or standards so that we are able in the future to assure our fire safety protection and prevention work against agreed benchmarks. Work has started on both the Building Safety Bill and other key consultations such as for Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPS) which will pick up in pace in 2021/22.
37. The introduction of the London Plan in March 2021 which sets out a framework for how London will develop over the next 20-25 years and the Mayor's vision for good growth has seen the introduction of the requirement for Fire Statements which is '*a standalone document which defines the fire safety objectives and performance requirements of a development, and the methods by which these objectives will be provided/ satisfied*' (sic). The impact of the fire statements is expected to raise the profile and deliver a tangible improvement to fire safety for new developments.
38. The Brigades High Risk Premises Team (HRPT) continues to work closely with the NFCC Protection Board and is now part of the Building Risk Review (BRR) Programme that is leading on London's activities in relation to not only high rise but also high risk buildings within London. In order to realise additional efficiencies, such as improved data sharing, performance reporting and coordination, the BRR was merged with the Operational Risk Information (ORI) project.
39. The ORI Project has resulted in around 8000 high-rise residential buildings having premises risk assessments being carried out by fire crews, while our fire safety teams have been triaging or auditing them to ensure that we have a joined up understanding of the risks each individual building may present in a fire.
40. In addition to the work of the HRPT, we continue to work closely with London Councils and seek to liaise on major consultations to share our experience, key concerns and identify areas of common interest. We also remain a standing member of the London Housing Directors' Fire Safety Group and Fire Safety Steering Group as these forums provide opportunities to influence and share information as well as providing updates as to the current status of the HRPT.
41. The Brigade has long advocated the use of sprinklers and will continue to lobby for them as part of an appropriate package of fire safety measures. We know that they play an important role in

reducing the devastating impact of fire on people, property, business continuity and the environment and assist firefighters in carrying out search and rescue operations by restricting the spread of fire.

42. We continue to ask the Government to take the recommendations from the [Hackitt review](#) on board – including further consideration of the use of sprinklers and other automated fire suppression systems (AFSS). The Brigade has its own sprinkler position statement and has a dedicated officer working on providing information, raising awareness and supporting the strategy.
43. To support our commitment to our outward facing fire safety activities, the Brigade , through protection uplift funding continues to recruit, train and support via the Centre of Learning and Excellence (CLE) and wider fire safety service improvement stream. Recruiting Fire Safety Advisors, working with National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) on validation of qualifications and training, upskilling operational colleagues in Fire Safety through Level 3 courses and introducing fire safety checks to be completed by firefighters based on fire stations are some of the core activities to maintain and build fire safety competency across the organisation. Our intention is to widen access to the CLE and offer shared learning with other fire and rescue services going forward.
44. To be better prepared for future challenges such as new legislation and the requirement for professional registration, as well as seeking improved effectiveness and efficiencies, a transformation plan for fire safety service delivery has been developed. The transformation plan is subject to ongoing consultation with both staff and representative bodies and it is expected that once consultation has been completed, the plan will be taken forward as a department project (while maintaining staff engagement), to be primarily delivered within 2021-22.
45. Under our core outward facing duty to promote fire safety, the Brigade has a long standing history of delivering Youth schemes. A youth review was undertaken in 2020 to streamline the LFB core youth offer to partner organisations. Our core youth programme includes a central offer of the Education Team, Safety First Blue Light secondary schools collaboration project, and the Juvenile Firesetters Intervention Scheme (JFIS), alongside Fire Cadets which has now been rolled out into every London Borough supported by Mayoral funding. Junior Citizens and Safe Drive, Stay Alive also continue to run at Borough level.
46. The blue light collaborative project 'The London Safety Centre' has now been established with the objectives of joining up prevention activity between the Metropolitan Police, London Ambulance Service and LFB, to improve joint engagement with the public. A number of initiatives have already been successful, including joint continuing professional development (CPD) sessions, referrals of high risk individuals between organisations, particularly hoarders, and 'Crime Prevention for Everyone' which seeks to train local housing officers in fire prevention and security risk.
47. A Home Fire Safety Visit improvement project is underway to ensure all staff are trained to adopt a person centred approach, and to raise awareness of new and arising trends and issues. In addition, a new online Home Fire Safety Checker has been launched to support selfassessment for those that can make small changes to keep themselves safe, whilst still offering face to face visits for those that need it the most.

48. Officers have ensured that the agendas of both prevention and protection work are represented within the Brigade's Community Engagement Strategy. Fire safety officers have been collaboratively working with the Community Engagement Team, particularly in the wake of the New Providence Wharf incident, to ensure recommendations are addressed.
49. Officers have also been working with Communications department colleagues to develop a comprehensive digital strategy encompassing both prevention and protection in a bid to improve our targeted communications as well as clear, concise messaging and self-help tools to members of the public and businesses that we engage with.

### **Mutual aid agreements**

50. Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic collisions and emergencies within their area, and in other areas in line with mutual aid agreements. We refer to these arrangements as 'cross border' and resources that may be requested to deploy cross-border are mobilised under mutual aid arrangements provided for under sections 13 and 16 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (FRSA).
51. The Brigade holds mutual aid agreements with all its surrounding fire and rescue authority areas. Incidents where there could be resources from two or more fire and rescue services are a relatively common occurrence between the Brigade and the six surrounding fire authorities namely – Hertfordshire, Essex, Kent, Surrey, Royal Berkshire, and Buckinghamshire. Brigade resources may also be mobilised cross border to 'standby' at neighbouring FRS stations. Deployments for 2020/21 show that the Brigade mobilised to 649 cross border incidents. This is a 12.5 per cent increase from 2019/20 (577). However, the number of incidents attended by neighbouring authorities for incidents in London, at 318, has decreased by 23 per cent since 2019/20 (413).
52. Charging neighbouring fire and rescue authorities on a cost recovery basis for the use of Brigade resources under section 13/16 of the FRSA was introduced in April 2014. This has been reciprocated by our neighbouring fire and rescue authorities who also charge the Brigade for the use of their resources.

### **National Resilience**

53. National resilience is defined as the capacity and capability of fire and rescue authorities to work together and with other Category 1 and 2 responders to deliver a sustained, effective response to major incidents, emergencies and disruptive challenges, such as (but not limited to) those identified in the [National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies](#).
54. It refers to risks that need to be planned for on a strategic, national basis because their impacts and consequences would be of such scale and/or complexity that local resources would be insufficient, even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action.
55. The National Framework makes clear there is a need to plan for, and occasionally respond, to incidents of such scale and/or complexity. Thus, the Government retains strategic responsibility for national resilience, though, of course, it is heavily reliant upon local fire and rescue authorities in support of this. And so, the National Framework sets out the requirement of Fire and Rescue Authorities to work collectively but also with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board to provide assurance to government that:

- Risks are assessed, plans are in place and any gaps between existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience are identified;
- Existing specialist national resilience capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient; and
- Any new capabilities that fire and rescue authorities are commissioned to deliver by Government are procured, maintained and managed in the most cost-effective manner that delivers value for money whilst ensuring capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient.

56. The programme consists of a number of distinct capabilities. These are:

- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive CBRN(E);
- Urban Search and Rescue (USAR);
- Water and High Volume Pumping (HVP); and
- Command and Control.

57. A number of the National Resilience assets are located within the Brigade area reflecting the importance of the capital city to national resilience in providing these capabilities to both the London region and the rest of the country.

58. The Brigade has a full USAR capability and also hosts CBRN(E), Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) and HVP capabilities.

59. Assessment and assurance for the Brigade's National Resilience assets is exercised through the National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT). The assurance process has been developed as a long term programme to ensure that the fire and rescue services, which have received National Resilience assets, achieve and maintain an efficient, robust and effective operational capability to respond to national and major emergencies. In previous years, this has centred on thematic reviews, including multi-capability and the dedicated use of equipment and vehicles. The assessment process has now changed to a three year rolling programme. At a high level, the process works as follows:

- Year 1 – Self-assessment
- Year 2 – Coordinated exercise with direct observation by NRAT
- Year 3 – National or regional exercise.

60. The Brigade has recently completed year three of the USAR assurance programme with a full scale exercise at Waddington training centre, Lincolnshire.

61. A report was issued highlighting some areas of improvement and an action plan has been developed to address these recommendations accordingly.

62. Brigade staff also have a primary role for the national fire sectors delivery of the UK Government Counter Terrorism, CONTEST. This involves working collaboratively with colleagues from the other blue light services, partner agencies and government departments to develop multi-agency capabilities for responding to a wide range of terrorist and high threat incidents. The London Fire Commissioner is the National Fire Chief Council's (NFCC) Counter-Terrorism lead and Chair of the Counter Terrorism Strategic Board (CTSB). The Assistant Commissioner for Operational Resilience and Control is the NFCC lead for Marauding Terrorist Attacks (MTA). London developed and implemented the concept of National Inter-agency liaison officers (NILOs) which

is embedded across the emergency services throughout the UK. The Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Operational Resilience is the NILO National Coordinator which includes delivery of the NILO foundation course for all services.

### **Business Continuity**

63. There are a number of identified infrastructure and workforce related risks that are relevant to the Brigade. These can largely be divided into two categories: those risks that have the potential to place high levels of demand on the operational service (major incidents and emergencies) and those risks that have the potential to disrupt the service (business disruptions).
64. The Brigade has established business continuity arrangements in place. Since 2005 there has been a formal business continuity programme which has led to the successful identification of the activities that are critical to the organisation, enabled the exploration of the dependencies that exist between them and has assisted in the development and review of business continuity plans.
65. It is important that continuity arrangements are tested to assess their adequacy and to incorporate lessons learnt from testing to further improve plans. The Brigade testing and exercising programme includes formats such as departmental table top tests, corporate exercises and specialised tests such as ICT disaster management procedures.
66. During 2020/21, the Brigade's continuity function was wholly engaged with LFB's response to (and recovery from) COVID-19 which reduced capacity for scenario testing and exercising. Instead, regular Commissioner's Continuity Group (CCG) meetings have been held to coordinate the Brigade's ongoing response to COVID-19 – this has in effect taken the place of a continuous 'live' continuity event for the entire year which is an extremely unusual situation. There is more on this in the COVID-19 section below. Plans are being developed to return to normal exercising but this is dependent on what happens with COVID-19. At the time of writing, co-ordination of continuity activities is still very much centred on the pandemic.
67. In addition to the business continuity requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, fire and rescue authorities also have a statutory duty under Section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to "secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary to efficiently meet all normal requirements". To meet the requirements of this duty, there are contingency arrangements (emergency fire crew capability (EFCC)) to deploy emergency fire crews and fire appliances capable of delivering services within a defined concept of operations. These arrangements have not needed to be used during 2020/21.

### **COVID-19**

68. As previously reported, a new coronavirus disease (COVID-19) causing respiratory symptoms was first identified in December 2019 in China. The World Health Organization declared the outbreak of COVID-19 a pandemic on the 11 March 2020, as a result of COVID-19 spreading worldwide.
69. Throughout the disruption the Brigade has managed to operate at a steady state with all critical activities (i.e. those activities necessary for the delivery of key Brigade services) being managed as per our Business Continuity arrangements. Our capacity to respond to incidents and maintain our response time has been mostly unaffected and degradation strategies have been put in place to manage the impact on our staffing numbers.

70. In-line with our Strategic Response arrangements (SRA) the Commissioner's Continuity Group (CCG) has been convened on a regular basis to provide strategic management of the incident and ensure that the LFB remains prepared for any potential impacts of COVID-19 spread in London. We have also continued our liaison with the National Fire Chiefs' Council to ensure sharing of best practice and information across the country and to make sure that we are aligned with the national position as relevant.
71. We have adopted an approach limiting some activities in-line with Government's 'social distancing' strategy. However, we have continued to provide our full emergency fire and rescue service response, maintaining operational assurance at buildings with simultaneous / waking watch provision, Fire Safety Inspecting Officer activity with additional pre appointment screening, alleged fire risk inspections again with additional pre appointment screening, operational risk database visits, premises risk assessment including high rise information gathering, and petroleum visits / hydrant inspections.
72. As well as ensuring our own critical activities are managed we have been able to assist our partner agencies through the Local Resilience Forum by providing staff and resources to support the pan London response with staff trained and deployed to assist the London Ambulance Service deliver its front line service through Ambulance Driver Assist (ADA), pandemic multi-agency response teams (PMART), and logistical support to the NHS.
73. The Brigade has a dedicated Recovery Group which is assisting in plotting the path to recovery by prioritising the resumption of critical/important activities through risk assessments and aligning these to best support the governments social distancing relaxation plans. This group has been capturing lessons learnt and good practice to inform organisational improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and minimise the impact on our staff and their wellbeing.
74. The Brigade has completed an equalities impact assessment of COVID-19 to identify the associated impacts on the organisation. This assessment paid particular attention to the Public Health England report titled '*Disparities in the risk and outcomes from COVID-19*', which discusses the differences observed in health outcomes from coronavirus infection for different groups of people. The Brigade's assessment subsequently identified a range of impacts and associated mitigating actions.
75. All staff have completed an individual COVID-19 risk assessment that identifies their individual risk from known factors such as their age, gender, ethnicity and health status, allowing for managers to identify specific additional risk controls required to keep staff at higher individual risk safe from poor health outcomes. Guidance for managers and staff was produced in relation to both individual COVID-19 risk assessment and for the broader impacts that might face staff during the pandemic.
76. It should also be noted that the outcome of a HMICFRS inspection looking at the response to the COVID-19 pandemic found that LFB was quick to review plans, staff wellbeing was a priority and the Brigade was swift to work with others, while continuing to satisfy its core statutory function. It also commended staff who took part in Operation Braidwood which saw the Brigade deliver 20 million pieces of PPE, firefighters driving ambulances to more than 110,000 incidents and staff also delivering food and medicine to vulnerable people.

77. The Brigade is monitoring changes in Government guidance as COVID restrictions are generally relaxed to ensure that workplace risk control measures remain effective and proportionate, particularly where staff are returning to Brigade workplaces after predominantly working from home for the pandemic period.
78. It is likely that the impact of the coronavirus will have a long term effect on the Brigade's finances. It is hard to be certain about the overall financial impact, but the Brigade has incurred additional costs in 2020/21 owing to the pandemic which have been met through cost recovery and additional grant income. There is also an expectation that COVID-19 will impact on future funding, and although the final budget for the year showed this wasn't at the levels previously estimated, there is still uncertainty and this will be further considered in the Mayor's Budget Guidance for the coming financial year. The existing financial controls provide the mechanism to regularly review these costs and their impact on the budget position.


## **Governance assurance**

79. The LFC is a corporation sole that came into being on 1 April 2018, replacing the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). The Mayor of London issued a [London Fire Commissioner Governance Direction 2018](#) in March 2018 to set out those matters requiring Mayoral consent, those requiring the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience's consent and those on which the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience needs to be consulted. It also requires the LFC to adopt the Greater London Authority (GLA) corporate governance framework and to follow GLA practice on staff political restrictions, based on those in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. In addition, the functions of the LFC shall be exercised by the office holder to fulfil the commitments given by LFEPA as a signatory to the GLA Group Corporate Governance Framework Agreement.
80. The LFC's governance framework is based on the CIPFA/SoLACE Delivering Good Governance *in Local Government Framework 2016* which requires the LFC to be responsible for ensuring that:
- business is conducted in accordance with all relevant laws and regulations;
  - public money is safeguarded and properly accounted for; and
  - resources are used economically, efficiently and effectively to achieve agreed priorities which benefit local people.
81. This includes: defining scrutiny arrangements; maintaining effective policies and procedures on whistleblowing and complaint handling (on the London Fire website); and engaging with all sections of the local community through community safety strategies and partnerships to ensure accountability. The LFC has a scheme of governance (*LFC-0335*) which incorporates a Corporate Code of Governance. The scheme sets out detailed governance arrangements for the Commissioner as the fire and rescue authority for London. It complies with the GLA Group Corporate Governance Framework and is drafted to ensure that the high standard of governance and accountability achieved by the predecessor Authority is continued.
82. The system of internal control is also a significant part of the LFC's governance framework and is designed to manage risk to a reasonable level. It cannot eliminate all risk of failure to achieve policies, aims and objectives; it can therefore only provide reasonable and not absolute assurance of effectiveness.

83. The system of internal control is based on an ongoing process designed to identify and prioritise the risks to the achievement of the LFC's policies, aims and objectives, to evaluate the likelihood of those risks being realised and the impact should they be realised, and to manage them efficiently, effectively and economically.

### Decision making framework and scrutiny

84. The London Fire Commissioner's decision-making framework is outlined below:



85. Steps one to three incorporate the LFC's internal decision making structures. Step four is required by the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience to ensure that only approved business proceeds to the GLA for consideration. Step five is required for documents produced by LFC, including this Statement of Assurance and similar documents such as the Annual Governance Statement, that fall under the national framework; these require a report and consideration by the Fire, Resilience and Emergency Planning Committee (as the proper instrument of the London Assembly). Steps six and seven are Greater London Authority (GLA) stages, required for a formal decision of the Mayor or Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience (DMFR) where the London Fire Commissioner has been required to consult or seek prior consent by the Mayor's London Fire Commissioner Governance Direction 2018. Steps six and seven are not needed in matters that require prior consultation, as opposed to prior approval. Step eight is the final stage in the process.

86. Scrutiny of the decision making framework is exercised through the Directorate Boards, the LFC's Commissioner's Board, the Deputy Mayor's Fire and Resilience Board, and the London Assembly via the Fire, Resilience and Emergency Planning Committee.

87. During 2020/21, a further element has been added to the London Fire Commissioner's scrutiny arrangements with the establishment of an Audit Committee. This was an action in the Transformation Delivery Plan and provides further external scrutiny regarding the actions and decisions taken by the LFC.

88. In terms of the impact of COVID-19 on governance arrangements, there continues to be minimal impact to date. Governance and decision making meetings are able to be conducted virtually through Microsoft Teams which ensures that decisions and business as usual can progress.

### **Review of effectiveness of governance arrangements**


89. The LFC uses a number of ways to review the effectiveness of governance arrangements. One of the key assurance statements, in reviewing effectiveness, is the annual report and opinion of the external auditors. Another significant element is the internal audit function conducted on behalf of the LFC by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC). MOPAC is fully compliant with Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS). Internal audit covers key governance processes, risk management and internal controls. During 2020/21, MOPAC reported on a number of areas, including all key financial systems. The internal auditors' opinion for 2020/21 was that, based on the areas audited, the LFC's control framework is adequately designed although some controls are not operating effectively to mitigate key system risks. The end of year report detailing the work conducted by MOPAC can be located [here](#).
90. The preparation of an Annual Governance Statement to support the Annual Statement of Accounts is a statutory requirement for local authorities. Its purpose is to demonstrate and evidence that there is a continuous review of the effectiveness of the Authority's internal control, performance and risk management systems. The latest statement for 2020/21 includes an continuing improvement action regarding the effective and timely delivery of the remaining actions in the Transformation Delivery Plan (TDP), including delivery of the HMICFRS and Grenfell Tower Inquiry action plans. The Annual Governance Statement forms part of the Statement of Accounts 2020/21 and can be found: [here](#).

### **Transparency**

91. The LFC met the mandatory data publication as set out in the DCLG Transparency Code (February 2015). There is a dedicated transparency page on the London Fire Brigade website [here](#) as well as a number of data sets on the [London Data Store](#), including data for all incidents attended and resources mobilised to those incidents since January 2009 (updated monthly). The web mapping tool ([here](#)) allows users to see the numbers of different types of incidents as well as attendance times for first and second fire engines down to ward level, and is updated monthly.

### **Risk register refresh and assurance framework development during 2020/21**

92. Enterprise (organisational-wide) risk management forms a cross-cutting strand of the Brigade's transformation blueprint (see below). To transform effectively and to meet our mission statement 'trusted to serve and protect', we need to be sighted on, and be taking active steps to manage our most significant risks.



93. The Brigade has a long-standing corporate risk register which forms an important part of the published quarterly corporate performance report. However, the London Fire Commissioner's (LFC's) Transformation Delivery Plan (TDP) which was the beginning of the Brigade's transformation journey, has taken LFB in a different direction.
94. The TDP led to the conclusion that the 'current' corporate risks did not necessarily reflect the LFC's vision nor provide the required insight into barriers that may prevent the Brigade from transforming effectively while continuing to deliver business as usual activities.
95. As a result, risk register refresh/development work was carried out from November 2020 through to March 2021. The development work involved over 40 workshops with all departments alongside continuous risk support and feedback activity from the small central risk team situated within the Transformation Directorate.
96. The risk register refresh and validation of these new risks is a vital step in the development of an assurance framework for the Brigade as it clearly identifies significant risks and associated key controls that the Brigade needs to assure itself on in terms of effectiveness. Development work during 2020/21 has involved consultations with NHS trusts who utilise the 'three lines of defence' model outlined in the [HM Treasury Guidance on Assurance Frameworks](#). NHS trusts aggregate the outputs of their assurance framework in a Business Assurance Framework (BAF) report which is considered regularly by management boards. The BAF brings together all the relevant information on the risks to the organisation's strategic objectives and is an essential tool to enable effective organisational oversight of the strategic risks to priorities.
97. Work is progressing on the Brigade's BAF (which will mirror NHS good practice) alongside consideration of the resource requirements to provide the organisational oversight to validate the

Brigade's first line of defence activities and will come into force during the next financial year. Our BAF will provide assurance to the LFC and other stakeholders by integrating our risk management with our strategy setting, the identification of risks that present barriers to our success, and by assessing the effectiveness of our risk controls using sources of intelligence such as performance data.

### **Culture review**

98. Following the tragic loss of a firefighter who took their own life in August 2020, an inquest and internal investigation into the death has made recommendations leading the Brigade to ask some difficult questions about how it supports staff.
99. Although the Togetherness Strategy has started the conversation about Brigade culture, what it means and the ambition to create a culture where everyone feels supported, an external, independent review of the Brigade's culture was announced at the end of 2020/21 and will commence in the next financial year. The review will help the Brigade provide some answers to how culture is perceived at the Brigade and what needs to be done to improve it. An update on progress will follow in next year's statement.

### **Financial assurance**

100. All local authority accounts are required to adopt 'proper accounting practice' based on either statutory requirements or the Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the UK (the Code) as published by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). These specify the principles and practices of accounting required to prepare a Statement of Accounts that 'present a true and fair view'.
101. For the financial year, 2020/21, the Director of Corporate Services approved the draft Statement of Accounts 2020/21 on 2 July 2021, and these were then published and passed for external audit.
102. An independent audit of the accounts is undertaken by an external audit provider. For the year 2020/21, this work was undertaken by Ernst and Young LLP.
103. The external auditor undertakes a review of the accounts and forms an overall opinion which is published as part of the audited Statement of Accounts.
104. A copy of the Statement of Accounts for 2020/21, including the external auditor's opinion can be found: [here](#).

### **Efficiency Plan**

105. In March 2016 the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government invited local authorities to publish locally owned and locally driven four year efficiency plans. A separate efficiency plan was prepared to meet this requirement for the first four years. Subsequently the fire and rescue national framework set out the documents each Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) is required to produce, which include an annual efficiency plan, medium term financial strategy and a reserves strategy.
106. To meet this requirement a Medium Term Financial Plan and Reserves Strategy were approved as part of the LFC's Budget Submission to the Mayor (LFC-0432-D) for consultation

with the Fire Resilience and Emergency Planning Committee (FREP). The medium term financial plan has been updated to also meet the requirements of an efficiency plan covering 2021/22.

## **Inspection, Intervention and Accountability**

### **Grenfell Tower Inquiry**

107. On 14 June 2017, the Brigade received the first of multiple calls to a fire at Grenfell Tower in North Kensington. The fire affected all floors of the 25 storey building and was declared a major incident by the Brigade. The fire was the largest residential fire attended by the Brigade since the Second World War, and resulted in the deaths of 72 persons.
108. Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, which focused on what happened on the night of the fire, ended in December 2018. The Phase 1 report was published in October 2019 which incorporated a number of recommendations directed at the Brigade, together with recommendations aimed at other fire and rescue services and other emergency services. In addition, a number of recommendations were directed at building owners and managers and Her Majesty's Government.
109. Phase 2 of the Inquiry commenced in early 2020 but was suspended as a result of the COVID19 pandemic. The Inquiry recommenced in July 2020 and anticipates completing its hearings in 2022.
110. The key findings and the improvement actions to address the Phase 1 Inquiry recommendations, alongside the operational learning identified by the Brigade's internal investigation, were incorporated into a comprehensive action plan, which has been amalgamated with the reporting on the HMICFRS action plan and the associated Transformation Delivery Plan actions during 2020/21 (more on these later).
111. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry made a total of 46 recommendations in its Phase 1 report, directed to a number of different organisations or groups, including LFB, all fire and rescue services, emergency services, the Government, building owners or another specific groups (e.g., Metropolitan Police Service/London Ambulance Service).
112. Of these, a total of 14 recommendations were directed at LFB specifically with 15 directed at another group under which LFB falls (such as all fire and rescue services or emergency services generally). A further 11 were directed at partner agencies/other organisations but have an impact on LFB and require some action on our part to enable completion. The remaining six recommendations do not require any action by the LFB.
113. As at the end of 2020/21, 20 recommendations have now been completed of which 10 were recommendations directed specifically at LFB and seven were directed at another group under which LFB falls.
114. The deliverables are monitored through the Brigade's Portfolio Board which has subsumed the Transformation Board and progress is reported to the Home Office, the Mayor of London and HMICFRS on a monthly basis. It is planned to move to a quarterly reporting cycle during the next financial year.

## **Inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services**

115. In July 2017, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary's remit was extended to include inspections of fire and rescue services in England, and was subsequently renamed as Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS). As a result of this, HMICFRS now assesses and reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 45 fire and rescue services in England.
116. The Inspectorate provides a crucial assurance function to consider how effective and efficient fire and rescue services are, how well they manage their people and whether they are fulfilling their statutory obligations. The Inspectorate also highlights good practice and identifies areas where improvement is needed so that remedial or constructive action can be taken.
117. As a result of the Brigade's first full inspection, the HMICFRS concluded that the Brigade generally required improvement across all three areas. The Brigade accepted all 26 recommendations outlined in the inspection report and created an action plan to address these recommendations.
118. Included in the 26 recommendations were specific causes for concern related to addressing a risk critical skills gap identified in emergency driver training and incident command training. Actions have been put in place for these items and the driver training action has been closed ahead of the January 2022 completion date. The revalidation of level 1 incident command is still expected to be completed by December 2021 despite delays owing to COVID-19. Both actions feature prominently in the TDP and are being monitored by the Home Office, the Mayor's Office and HMICFRS.
119. Of the 26 HMICFRS recommendations, six have now been completed as at the end of 2020/21. Progress on the action plan is reported monthly to HMICFRS.
120. HMICFRS has also conducted two further thematic inspections of the Brigade during the latter part of 2020/21, examining LFB's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and assessing the Brigade's progress in implementing the recommendations from the GTI. As reported earlier (in the Business Continuity section), the HMICFRS commended the arrangements the Brigade had put in place to deal with COVID-19. The HMICFRS published the outcome of its GTI assessment in a [report on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry recommendations](#) in which it recognised good progress but also acknowledged that there was still a significant amount of work to do.
121. The next full round of HMICFRS inspections for the 45 fire and rescue services in England have been delayed owing to the coronavirus pandemic. The next full inspection of the Brigade is now expected to take place during the latter part of 2021/22.

## **Transformation Delivery Plan**

122. As a result of the inspection and Phase 1 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, the LFC worked with the senior leadership team to produce a delivery plan for the transformation of the Brigade - the aforementioned Transformation Delivery Plan (TDP). It sets out the short, medium and long-term priorities for the Brigade. The TDP includes clear actions with completion dates. The central purpose behind the plan is to get the Brigade to learn to adapt in a more agile and rapid way and to put in place the right behaviours to achieve this.

123. The TDP is based on four strategic pillars; (1) The best people and best place to work, (2) Seizing the future, (3) Delivering excellence, and (4) Outward facing. There are a number of actions against each pillar which the Brigade needs to deliver to transform itself.
124. The plan has been refreshed in light of some delays caused by COVID-19 but we remain fully committed to delivering every action in the plan and meeting every recommendation made by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and the HMICFRS report. One year into the plan, 41 of the 65 original improvement actions have been completed, with a further 3 closed due to overlap with existing GTI/HMICFRS actions.
125. The 'Outward facing' and 'Seizing the future' pillars continue to make good progress with more than 70 per cent of the actions completed by the end of 2020/21. Both pillars have three actions left to complete, of which, two are on track.
126. The 'Delivering excellence' pillar now also has over 70 per cent of actions completed with five actions left to complete, of which three are on track.
127. The 'Best people, best place to work' pillar continues to have the fewest actions completed to date but the majority of the 10 outstanding actions remain on track.
128. The TDP remains the Brigade's route to being a service that is 'trusted to serve and protect.'

## **Assurance Declaration**

129. This statement functions as the LFC's Statement of Assurance under the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework. Officers are satisfied that the elements of the LFC's system of internal control meets the requirements of the National Framework. Where recommendations have been made about the LFC's financial and governance and operational assurance arrangements through external assessment, appropriate action plans (including the TDP), have been put in place to improve and address these, to make sure that they are adequate and operating effectively.

Andy Roe

London Fire Commissioner



## Annex to the Statement of Assurance – Key evidence of compliance with the National Framework (2018)

Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
<b>Section 2: Delivery of Functions<sup>1</sup></b>	
<b>Identify and assess</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Every fire and rescue authority must assess all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect their communities, whether they are local, cross-border, multi-authority and/or national in nature from fires to terrorist attacks. Regard must be had to Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate.</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities must put in place arrangements to prevent and mitigate these risks, either through adjusting existing provision, effective collaboration and partnership working, or building new capability. Fire and rescue authorities should work through the Strategic Resilience Board where appropriate when determining what arrangements to put in place.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>London Safety Plan incorporating sections on:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Risk in London</li> <li>- Helping to make London safe</li> <li>- Responding in an emergency</li> <li>- Responding effectively (working with neighbouring brigades)</li> </ul> </li> <li>♦ <b>Assessment of local risk</b></li> <li>♦ <b>London Resilience Group</b></li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>London Safety Plan</b></li> <li>♦ Risk in London</li> <li>♦ - Helping to make London safe</li> <li>♦ - Responding in an emergency</li> <li>♦ - Responding effectively (working with neighbouring brigades)</li> <li>♦ <b>London Blue light collaboration</b></li> </ul>
<b>Prevent and protect</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities must make provision for promoting fire safety, including fire prevention, and have a locally determined risk-based inspection programme in place for enforcing compliance with the provisions of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in premises to which it applies.</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>LSP Commitments:</b> LSP1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12</li> <li>♦ <b>Home Fire Safety Full Guide (on website)</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Essential reading for businesses and organisations (on website)</b></li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Section 1 of the National Framework (2018) is the Introduction

<b>Respond</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic collisions and other emergencies within their area and in other areas in line with their mutual aid agreements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>London Safety Plan - Responding in an emergency</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Cross border agreements (Section 13/16 agreements)</b></li> </ul>
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		<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Compliance Evidenced</b>
<b>by:-Source Documents/Processes</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities must, so far as is practicable, enter into reinforcement schemes, or mutual aid agreements, with other fire and rescue authorities for securing mutual assistance.</li> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities must have effective business continuity arrangements in place in accordance with their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Within these arrangements, fire and rescue authorities must make every endeavour to meet the full range of service delivery risks and national resilience duties and commitments that they face. Business continuity plans should not be developed on the basis of armed forces assistance being available.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>Cross Border agreements (Section 13/16 agreements)</b></li> <li>♦ <b>National resilience assets</b></li> <li>♦ <b>National operational guidance programme</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Strategic Response Arrangements</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Corporate Business Continuity Policy</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Capitalguard</b></li> <li>♦ <b>London Local Authority Coordination Centre</b></li> <li>♦ <b>London Local Resilience Forum</b></li> </ul>	
<b>Collaboration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities to deliver intraoperability (between fire and rescue authorities) and interoperability (with other responders such as other emergency services, wider Category 1 and 2 responders and Local Resilience Forums) in line with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP). Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with the National Resilience Lead Authority to ensure interoperability is maintained for National Resilience assets.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>London Local Resilience Forum</b></li> <li>♦ <b>National Inter-agency liaison officer – LFB officer</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Inter-agency liaison offers (ILOs)</b></li> <li>♦ <b>JESIP</b></li> <li>♦ <b>NOL/JOL learning</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Joint statement of intent</b></li> <li>♦ <b>London blue light collaboration</b></li> </ul>	
<b>Section 3: National Resilience</b>			

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<b>National Resilience</b>	❖ Fire and rescue authorities must work with the lead authority to support the national resilience assurance processes in order to ensure capabilities are maintained at a high state of operational readiness. This includes co-operation of fire and rescue authorities, as necessary, on devolved training and, where applicable, on the long-term capability management arrangements.	❖ <b>London Fire Commissioner - National Resilience Lead CounterTerrorism</b> ❖ <b>Resilience partnership working with NFCC</b>
	❖ Fire and rescue services, through the NFCC's representation on the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board (FRSRB), must also work with Government to identify and address any national resilience capability gaps identified through ongoing analysis of the National Risk Assessment.	❖ <b>London Fire Commissioner - member of FRSRB</b> ❖ <b>Operational Policy Department management and risk assessment of operational policies</b>

<b>Requirement</b>		<b>Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes</b>
<b>Gap Analysis</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue authorities' risk assessments must include an analysis of any gaps between their existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience (as defined above).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>LSP commitment: LSP15</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Operational Resilience Department</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Special Operations Group</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Assessment by NRAT</b></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ As part of their analysis, fire and rescue authorities must highlight to the Home Office or the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, any capability gaps that they believe cannot be met even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>LFB lead in CONTEST strategy</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Home Office/FRSRB review and meetings</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Cross Border agreements (Section 13/16 agreements)</b></li> </ul>
<b>National Coordination and Advisory Framework</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) has been designed to provide robust and flexible response arrangements to major emergencies that can be adapted to the nature, scale and requirements of the incident. Fire and rescue authorities must proactively engage with, and support, the NCAF arrangements including the NFCC's lead operational role.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>Commissioner – member of NFCC</b></li> <li>♦ <b>LFB support and senior officer secondment for NFCC (and NCAF)</b></li> </ul>
<b>Response to Terrorist Attacks or Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ Fire and rescue services must be able to respond to the threat of terrorism and be ready to respond to incidents within their areas and across England. Fire and rescue services should also be interoperable to provide operational support across the UK to terrorist events as required. Government recognises the critical contribution of fire and rescue services when responding to acts of terrorism. This is an agreed function of fire and rescue services as set out in the National Joint Council for Local Authority Fire and Rescue Services Scheme of Conditions of Service ("the Grey Book") and is encompassed within the broad descriptions within the existing agreed firefighter role maps: to save and preserve endangered life, and safely resolve operational incidents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦ <b>Special Operations Group – Counter terrorism work streams</b></li> <li>♦ <b>Negotiation and ballot for agreement with representative bodies (MTA)</b></li> </ul>

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<b>National Resilience Assurance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must continue to work collectively and with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board and the national resilience lead authority to provide assurance to government that:           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ existing national resilience capabilities are fit for purpose and robust; and</li> <li>❖ risks and plans are assessed and any gaps in capability that are needed to ensure national resilience are identified.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>Commissioner – member of FRSRB</b></li> <li>❖ <b>LFB lead in CONTEST strategy</b></li> <li>❖ <b>National Resilience Assurance Team</b></li> <li>❖ <b>National resilience assets</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Exercise programmes – USAR, Unified Response</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Lambeth Blue Light Demonstration Day</b></li> </ul>
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Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities with MTFA teams must work with police forces and ambulance trusts to provide tri-service assurance of this capability.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>Operational Resilience officer seconded to National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (NCTPHQ)</b></li> <li>❖ <b>National Inter-agency Liaison officers (NILO) work closely with CT Policing and other key agencies.</b></li> </ul>

**Section 4: Governance**

<b>Managing the Fire and Rescue Service/Chief Fire Officer</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Each fire and rescue authority will appoint an individual – commonly known as a Chief Fire Officer – who has responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service. This role does not have to be operational but includes managing the personnel, services and equipment secured by the fire and rescue authority for the purposes of carrying out functions conferred on it by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and other enactments. Each fire and rescue authority must hold this person to account for the exercise of their functions and the functions of persons under their direction and control.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>Mayor appoints LFC</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Deputy Mayor's Fire and Resilience Board</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Fire Resilience and Emergency Planning Committee + Audit Committee</b></li> </ul>
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ The chief fire officer must, in exercising their functions, have regard to the fire and rescue authority's Integrated Risk Management Plan and any set objectives and priorities which may be outlined in a strategic plan. The fire and rescue authority should give due regard to the professional advice of the Chief Fire Officer while developing the Integrated Risk Management Plan and when making decisions affecting the fire and rescue service.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◆ <b>London Safety Plan</b></li> <li>◆ <b>LFB quarterly performance reports</b></li> <li>◆ <b>Development of Community Risk Management Plan (CRMP)</b></li> </ul>
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Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
<b>Documents to be prepared:</b> <p><b>i) Integrated Risk Management Plan</b></p>	<p>◆ Each plan must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ ◆ reflect up to date risk analyses including an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect the area of the authority;</li> <li>□ ◆ demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to prevent fires and other incidents and mitigate the impact of identified risks on its communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a way that makes best use of available resources;</li> </ul> <p>◆ outline required service delivery outcomes including the allocation of resources for the mitigation of risks;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>□ ◆ set out its management strategy and risk-based programme for enforcing the provisions of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in accordance with the principles of better regulation set out in the Statutory Code of Compliance for Regulators, and the Enforcement Concordat;</li> <li>□ ◆ cover at least a three-year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary to ensure that the authority is able to deliver the requirements set out in this Framework;</li> </ul>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>♦ reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies and partners; and<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>I ♦ be easily accessible and publicly available.</li></ul></li></ul>	
<b>ii) Annual statement of assurance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>♦ The statement should outline the way in which the authority and its fire and rescue service has had regard – in the period covered by the document – to this National Framework, the Integrated Risk Management Plan and to any strategic plan (e.g. the Fire and Rescue Plan – see 4.10 below) prepared by the authority for that period. The authority must also provide assurance to their community and to government on financial, governance and operational matters. For PCC FRAs, this statement is subject to scrutiny by the Police, Fire and Crime Panel. The name of this statement differs across governance models (e.g. in the case of PCC FRAs it is called the 'Fire and Rescue Statement' and in Greater Manchester the 'Fire and Rescue Declaration').</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>♦ <b>Statement of Assurance 2020/21 (this document)</b></li></ul>

		Requirement	Compliance Evidenced
<b>by:-Source Documents/Processes</b>			
<b>iii) Financial plans</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ A medium-term financial strategy, an efficiency plan and a reserves strategy. These can be combined or published separately.</li> </ul>	
<b>Section 5: Achieving Value For Money</b>			
<b>Achieving Value for Money</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must manage their budgets and spend money properly and appropriately, and ensure the efficient and effective use of their resources, pursuing all feasible opportunities to keep costs down while discharging their core duties effectively. Fire and rescue authorities should regularly review the numbers and deployment of firefighters and other staff to ensure that their fire and rescue service has a workforce that is commensurate with the risks that they face.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>LFC's Scheme of Governance</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Budget process</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Quarterly budget reporting and monitoring</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Performance reporting</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Recruitment and selection</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Director of Corporate Services is the Head of Paid Service and is responsible for all LFC staff</b></li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must ensure that financial decisions are taken with the advice and guidance of the chief finance officer and that decisions are taken with an emphasis on delivering value for money to the public purse. Fire and rescue authorities should ensure that management of their finances is undertaken with regard to published guidance including those set out at Annex B (of the National Framework).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>LFC's Scheme of Governance</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Treasury management</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Director of Corporate Services is the LFC's Section 127 Officer and is responsible for safeguarding the LFC's financial position and ensuring value for money</b></li> </ul>
<b>Commercial Transformation</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Each fire and rescue authority must demonstrate that it is achieving value for money for the goods and services it receives. Every fire and rescue authority should look at ways to improve its commercial practices including whether they can aggregate their procurement with other fire and rescue authorities and other local services (e.g. police) to achieve efficiencies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>GLA Collaboration Board</b></li> <li>❖ <b>London Blue Light Collaboration</b></li> <li>❖ <b>LFB Procurement policies and procedures</b></li> </ul>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must demonstrate and support national and local commercial transformation programmes where appropriate. Each fire and rescue authority should be able to demonstrate full awareness of the objectives to standardise requirements, aggregate demand and manage suppliers of products and services within their commercial arrangements.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>ESN programme</b></li> <li>❖ <b>PPE contract</b></li> </ul>
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<b>by:-Source Documents/Processes</b>		<b>Requirement</b>	<b>Compliance Evidenced</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must ensure that their commercial activities, be that the placement of new contracts or the use of existing contracts, is in line with their legal obligations, including but not limited to the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and transparency commitments.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>LFB Procurement policies and procedures</b></li> <li>❖ <b>Contracts Management Team</b></li> <li>❖ <b>General Counsel and legal review of contracts</b></li> </ul>	
<b>Trading</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must ensure any actions taken in respect of their trading companies are considered against the requirements of competition law. Any financial assistance – in cash or in kind – given by an authority that establishes or participates in it, should be for a limited period, set against the expectation of later returns, and re-paid by those returns. Any assistance should be provided under a formal agreement with the company and must be entered into for a commercial purpose. Before entering into such an agreement, the authority should satisfy itself that it will achieve its objective, and the company should satisfy itself that it will meet its objective in terms of its business plan. The parties should consider any State Aid implications and obtain their own expert advice where necessary.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ <b>LFBe – currently dormant</b></li> </ul>	
<b>Section 6: Workforce</b>			

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<b>Fitness principles</b>	❖ Fire and rescue authorities have an important role in helping to ensure their firefighters remain fit and are supported in remaining in employment. Each fire and rescue authority must comply with the fitness principles set out at Annex C (of the National Framework)	❖ <b>Fitness policy</b> ❖ <b>Wellbeing Strategy</b>
<b>Re-engagement of Senior Officers</b>	❖ Fire and rescue authorities must not re-appoint principal fire officers after retirement to their previous, or a similar, post save for in exceptional circumstances when such a decision is necessary in the interests of public safety. Any such appointment must be transparent, justifiable and time limited.	❖ <b>LFB recruitment policies</b>

by:-Source Documents/Processes	Requirement	Compliance Evidenced
	❖ To ensure greater fairness and the exchange of talent and ideas, all principal fire officer posts must be open to competition nationally, and fire and rescue authorities must take account of this in their workforce planning.	❖ <b>LFB principal officer posts - advertised externally</b>
<b>Section 7: Inspection, Intervention and Accountability</b>		
<b>Inspection</b>	❖ All fire and rescue authorities must cooperate with the inspectorate and its inspectors to enable them to deliver their statutory function. This includes providing relevant data and information to inform inspections. The Home Office and HMICFRS will work together to align data and information collections where possible to avoid duplication.	❖ <b>Strategy and Risk internal inspection support team</b> ❖ <b>Provision of data to HMICFRS by Information Management</b>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>❖ Fire and rescue authorities must give due regard to reports and recommendations made by HMICFRS and – if recommendations are made – prepare, update and regularly publish an action plan detailing how the recommendations are being actioned. If the fire and rescue authority does not propose to undertake any action as a result of a recommendation, reasons for this should be given. When forming an action plan, the fire and rescue authority could seek advice and support from other organisations, for example, the National Fire Chiefs Council and the Local Government Association; and, for those areas where a PFCC has responsibility for fire governance, the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>❖ <b>LFB's inspection report – December 2019</b></li><li>❖ <b>GT/HMI action plan</b></li></ul>
<b>Accountability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>❖ Each fire and rescue authority must hold the individual who has responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service – an operational or non-operational Chief Fire Officer – to account for the delivery of the fire and rescue service and the functions of persons under their direction and control. In London, the Mayor of London must hold the London Fire Commissioner, as fire and rescue authority for Greater London, to account for the exercise of the Commissioner's functions.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>❖ <b>Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience</b></li><li>❖ <b>Fire, Resilience and Emergency Planning Board meetings</b></li><li>❖ <b>Fire and Resilience Board meeting</b></li><li>❖ <b>Delegated authority arrangements</b></li><li>❖ <b>Committee/Board constitution/Terms of reference</b></li></ul>
<b>Requirement</b>		<b>Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes</b>

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<b>Transparency</b>	◆ Each fire and rescue authority must comply with their statutory transparency requirements. The nature of the requirements is dependent on the legal basis of the authority; for example, combined fire and rescue authorities would be subject to the Local Authority Transparency Code 2015 while PCC FRAs must comply with requirements under section 11 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and the Elected Local Policing Bodies (Specified Information) Order 2011. All fire and rescue authorities should therefore publish certain information, including: senior salaries; register of interests; staffing; income and expenditure; property; rights and liabilities; and decisions of significant public interest. Fire and rescue authorities must make their communities aware of how they can access data and information on their performance.	◆ <b>Data and transparency arrangements - London Fire</b> ◆ <b>London Datastore</b>
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# Statement of Assurance 2020/21

Performance data for five years to 2020/21

October 2021

The London Fire Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for London and is head of the London Fire Brigade.



## About this publication

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This document, and the accompanying tables, are available to download from the London Datastore at

<https://data.london.gov.uk/publisher/lfb>

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## The London Fire Commissioner and the London Fire Brigade

The London Fire Commissioner (LFC) is the fire and rescue authority for London and is head of the London Fire Brigade.

For more information about LFC and the work of the London Fire Brigade visit [www.london-fire.gov.uk](http://www.london-fire.gov.uk).

## Other LFB Data publications

The London Fire Brigade *Fire Facts* publications are:

- Fires incident response times – [here](#)
- Fires in Greater London – [here](#)
- Fatal fires in Greater London – [here](#)
- Finance and performance reporting 2020/21 – [here](#)

## Other data available

The LFB publishes a range of data on the London Datastore. Much of these data are updated on a monthly basis. Go to the LFB page on the datastore to see what is available – <https://data.london.gov.uk/publisher/lfb>.

## Version history

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# Introduction

This document sets out key performance information for five years to 2020/21 to support the Statement of Assurance (SoA) for 2020/21.

## Fifth London Safety Plan (LSP5)

Prior to the five year period covered by this document (in January 2014), changes were made to the number of fire stations and fire engines as part of the implementation of the [Fifth London Safety Plan<sup>1</sup>](#) (LSP5). The LSP5 was approved by the former London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) on 12 September 2013, following a Mayoral Direction. It originally covered a three-year period from April 2013 to March 2017 (2013/14 to 2016/17) but was extended for one year (2017/18). The major changes set out in the LSP5 were implemented on 9 January 2014 as follows:

- The closure of 10 fire stations.
- The number of fire engines (pumping appliances) reduced by 14 (net).
- Five appliances were redeployed to different stations.
- The number of fire rescue units (specialist rescue vehicles) reduced from 16 to 14.
- The minimum crewing levels on fire rescue units reduced from five firefighters to four.

Other changes at stations were introduced (before 9 January 2014) including:

- Alternate crewing introduced on the scientific support units at Poplar and Hammersmith.
- Alternate crewing introduced on the two remaining incident response units at Wimbledon and Plaistow
- On-demand mobilising for hose-laying and bulk foam units at the incident support centres.

In addition to these LSP5 changes, 13 further fire engines were permanently removed from stations in June 2016. These fire engines had been temporarily removed from stations in August 2013 to provide a contingency resource – the Emergency Fire Crew Capability (EFCC) – in the event of strike action.

## Current London Safety Plan

The current London Safety Plan 2017 was approved in March 2016 and covers a four-year period from April 2017 to March 2021 (2017/18 to 2020/21). It is available on the LFB website [here](#).

## Impacts on performance in the period since LSP5 to 2020/21

Performance in 2018/19 is impacted by a range of changes alongside those in LSP5 which includes

- the initial temporary removal and ultimate permanent removal of EFCC appliances from stations; and
- station/appliance temporary changes as a result of the PFI station rebuilding programme (between April 2014 to June 2016).


In considering some of the numbers in this document, it is important to recognise the changes to fire stations and fire engines in earlier performance years (April to March), as follows:

- **in 2014/15** – the performance year with LSP5 changes fully implemented, but still with 13 EFCC appliances temporarily removed and station temporary closures arising from the station rebuilding (PFI) project.
- **in 2015/16** – the performance year with LSP5 changes fully implemented, 13 EFCC appliances temporarily removed from stations, and temporary station closures arising from the PFI station rebuilding programme. In November 2015, a new mobilising system was live, which introduced (a) mobilising to individual addresses (rather to a

<sup>1</sup> The London Safety Plan is the LFC's Integrated Risk Management Plan.

street); and (b) geographic mobilising which used a fire engine location to determine which was closest to be mobilised to an incident.

- **in 2016/17** – the performance with LSP5 changes fully implemented, 13 EFCC appliances temporarily removed from stations from April 2016 and permanently removed from June 2016, and there were a few temporary station closures arising from the PFI station rebuilding programme in April, May and June 2016.
- **in 2017/18** – there were no changes to fire stations or fire appliances this year.
- **in 2018/19** – there were no changes to fire stations or fire appliances this year.
- **In 2019/20** – the SoA year. There were no changes to fire stations or fire appliances this year.
- **In 2020/21** – the SoA year. There were no changes to fire stations or fire appliances this year.




# Performance reporting

The data in this document is not focussed on performance against indicators/targets but provides a trend analysis for the various data sets presented.


The Brigade publishes a quarterly performance report (for end June, September, December and March) usually within about six weeks of the end of the relevant quarter. These quarterly reports can be found on the Brigade's web site ([here](#) – search for *performance*) and also on the London Datastore; for 2020/21 [here](#), and for the current year (2021/22) [here](#).

The data published in this document for 2020/21 is consistent with the end of year *Our Performance* report (available on the London Datastore [here](#)).




## Emergency calls received and incidents attended


- The numbers of emergency (999) calls received and the incidents attended over the five years to 2020/21 are set out in the chart below. Data for incidents attended is available in annex 1C (borough) and 2B (ward). Emergency call data is not available at ward or borough level as the location of a caller is not captured.
- London-wide, the number of **incidents attended** by the Brigade in 2020/21 was eight per cent lower than in the previous year and was six per cent lower than the five-year average. The number of **emergency calls received** had been gradually increasing up to 2018/19, but in 2020/21 it decreased by eight per cent compared to the five-year average.



- The total number of **fires** attended was some 10 per cent lower in 2020/21 compared to five years earlier, and remains below 20,000 annually. The number of **special services** attended in 2020/21 was seven per cent lower than the previous year, the number is four per cent lower than the five-year period. **False alarms** show a year-on-year upward trend up until 2020/21 where it decreased by 11 per cent, and was down by six per cent across the five years.



- In 2020/21, the proportions of different types of incident is shown in the chart below. False alarms now represent some 50 per cent of all incidents attended, with special services at 32 per cent and fires at 18 per cent.




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# Attendance times

## First, second and third pumping appliances

- The London-wide attendance time performance<sup>2</sup> for first, second and third pumping appliances (fire engines) is summarised in the chart below. London-wide and borough attendance times for five years are set out in annex 1A (borough) and Annex 2A (ward). Attendance times are measured from the time the appliance is mobilised to arrival of the appliance at the incident address, although the Brigade does publish the full incident response time (from the time the 999 call is answered to arrival of the appliance at the incident scene – see below). The Brigade's attendance standards are for performance London-wide, and whilst it aims to meet its attendance standard at borough level but does not undertake to meet the standards at any smaller geography (e.g. at ward level). We also measure the total time from answering a 999 call to arrival of fire engines at the incident (the 'incident response time'), this is set out below, and in annex 1A and 2A.




- Average speed of arrival for a **first appliance** at an incident in 2020/21, at 4m:59s, it was the fastest time over the last five years, 23 seconds faster than in 2016/17. In 2020/21, none of the boroughs fell outside of the six minute average target for first appliance.
- London-wide, **second appliance** average response time to incidents in 2020/21, at 6m:11s, was 33 seconds faster than in 2016/17. In 2020/21, no borough was outside the second appliance average attendance target of eight minutes.
- London-wide, the average **third appliance** response time in 2020/21, at 7m:05s, was 55 seconds faster than in 2016/17, and the fastest time out of the five years shown. There is no target for third appliance speed of arrival, but performance is well within the benchmark average of 10 minutes used during LSP5 consultation. No borough in 2020/21 fell outside this 10 minute benchmark.

<sup>2</sup> See the 'Notes on data;' on page 23.


- In considering attendance time performance, it should be noted that 58 per cent of all incidents were attended by only one appliance; 32 per cent of incidents received two appliances, with just 10 per cent receiving three or more appliances. The data underpinning third appliance attendance time performance is, therefore, more limited than that for the first or second appliance.

### Pumps attending incidents in 2020/21



### Overall pumping appliance 'incident' response time and crew turn-out time

- The overall **incident response time** (from time of call to arrival of first appliance) in 2020/21, at 6m:44s, was 24 seconds faster than five years earlier (2016/17). The London-wide performance is shown in the chart below. As the incident response time covers call handling, the equivalent performance target (for a first appliance) would be an average 7m:40s (1m:40s call handling plus six-minute attendance). Only Hillingdon borough had an incident response time outside this notional target at 7m:44s. Details of the overall **incident response time** between answering the 999-call answer and arrival of the first pumping appliance at incident scene are published for in annexes 1A (borough) and 2A (ward).
- Crew turn-out** performance, at 1m:16s, was slightly faster than in previous years. The crew turn-out time is part of the first, second and third appliance response times (which are measured from the time of mobilisation to arrival at the incident address). Data on pumping appliance crew turnout performance is available by borough in annex 1A; as this data is for station watch performance, it is not available at ward level.




## Special appliances

- Data for special appliance average response times – for fire rescue units (FRUs) and aerial appliances – is shown in the chart below for five years up to 2020/21. Data for borough and ward performance is shown in annex 1B and annex 2A respectively.
- London-wide, average **aerial appliance** response times were 8m:24s in 2020/21. This is time is some 9 second faster than the year before (8m:33s). There is no attendance standard for aerial appliances. There were no changes made to the number or deployment of aerial appliances in LSP5 or over the five years for which data is displayed. Performance is relatively consistent over the five years.
- London-wide, average **fire rescue unit** response times were 11m:42s in 2020/21, this is slower than the year before, and 15 seconds slower than the five year average. The LSP5 reduced the number of Fire Rescue Units from 16 to 14 (i.e. two fewer). There is no attendance standard for fire rescue units.



## Ward pumping appliance attendance times


- Ward data for first and second pumping appliance attendance times is in annex 2A. The Brigade does not undertake to meet its attendance standard at ward level.
- 82 per cent of wards in 2020/21 had a **first appliance** within the average six-minute target (it was 77 per cent in the previous year, 2019/20). Comparing performance in 2020/21 with 2016/17, there were 64 fewer wards outside target in the most recent year (2020/21).




- Performance for **first appliance** comparing 2020/21 with 2016/17 shows fewer wards outside the target. Of the 119 wards outside the first appliance average six-minute target in 2019/20, 31 wards were within 30 seconds or less of the target with 26 wards more than 30 seconds outside the target. The chart below shows wards outside the target within four time bands to show how far they were away from the target, together with the cumulative number of wards at each time band.



- Performance for second appliance comparing 2020/21 against 2016/17 shows fewer wards outside the target in the most recent year, compared to five years earlier and 91 per cent of wards were within the average eight minute second appliance target.




- Of the 56 wards outside the second appliance average eight minute target in 2020/21, 63 wards were within 30 seconds of the target, and 26 wards more than 30 seconds outside the target. The chart below shows wards outside the target within four time bands, to show how far they were away from the target, together with the cumulative number of wards at each time band.




# Fire casualties (fatal and non-fatal)

- Data about fire casualties is available in annexes 1D (borough) and 2B (ward) respectively. The number of fire deaths at borough and ward level is generally very small, so there are always limitations on the statistical conclusions that can reliably be drawn from these datasets.
- The chart below shows the numbers of fire casualties (fatal and non-fatal) for the five years to 2020/21. There was an upturn in all casualties in 2017/18 as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire. The 10-year average for all fire deaths is also impacted by the number of fatalities from the Grenfell Tower fire.




- There are different **types of fire death**. Some are result of deliberate acts (which will include deliberate fire-setting (arson), suicide, or homicide), and some are accidental. Of the accidental fire deaths, the cause of the fire can be the result of faulty equipment or supply or have a human cause (e.g. careless disposal of a cigarette, clothing too close to a heat source). The fire deaths due to a human cause – and where the Brigade's community safety activity has most impact – were lower in 2020/21 than any other year shown. The 74 fire deaths in 2017/18 due to fires of "faulty appliance/supply" include the deaths at the Grenfell Tower fire.



Note: The 'Accidental: other' category includes fire deaths where the cause was not known or is still under investigation.  
The bar showing the 74 deaths in 2017/18 due to 'Accidental: faulty appliance/supply' has been truncated.

- One factor that is key to whether a person is injured or dies in a fire, is the **delay in discovering the fire and calling the fire brigade**. The chart below shows the estimated delay between ignition of the fire and calling the brigade, based on the work of crews and fire investigators. The five-year average to 2020/21 shows that 58 per cent of cases there was a delay of five minutes or more in calling the Brigade (data is not available for 20 per cent of fatalities).




Note: Typically, across the five years displayed, this data is not available for about 20 per cent of fire deaths.




# Fires

- Borough and ward data for all fires, primary (more serious) fires, accidental dwellings fires, and fires in care homes/sheltered housing, are in annexes 1C and 2B respectively.
- London-wide, the number of **primary fires**, which includes **accidental dwelling fires**, continued to fall in 2020/21. The number of **secondary fires** slightly increased in 2020/21, but it still lower compared to the previous five years; the numbers tend to fluctuate as open land and grass fires in summer months are a significant proportion of these fires and are higher in years which have warmer/drier summer periods (like 2016/17 and 2018/19).




- The total numbers of **primary fires** include incidents of different types; some will require no firefighting whilst others will require the attendance of a large number of fire engines. In 2020/21, 50 per cent of primary fires either required no firefighting or 'small means' (22 per cent), e.g. stamping out, bucket of water. Only 14 per cent of fires were attended by five or more fire engines<sup>3</sup>, or were larger fires (the use of main jets/hose reels).



<sup>3</sup> Note: the number of incidents attended by five or more fire engines includes those high-rise incidents which received an initial standard attendance of five fire engines; some of these incidents will not be significant or larger fires and would otherwise be categorised as medium or small fires, or would have required no firefighting.


- **Deliberate fires** (i.e. potential 'arson') have continued to fall and the number in 2020/21 is the lowest for the five years displayed, and some 38 per cent lower than in 2016/17.
- In the LSP5, the Brigade was concerned by the number of older people who are harmed or killed by **fires in care homes/sheltered housing** where they should be safe. We introduced a headline target (which is continued in the current London Safety Plan 2017) focusing on reducing the fires in care homes and sheltered housing. The numbers of these fires in these places has largely been reducing, with the number in 2020/21 some 16 per cent lower than the five year average.



# Fire safety

## Regulatory fire safety

- Data on **all fire safety inspections/audits** and for **inspection/audits to high-risk premises** and this data is provided at borough level only (annex 1E). London-wide data for the past five years, including 2020/21, is set out in the chart below. There is no direct relationship between the stations and pumping appliance reductions in LSP5 and the volume of regulatory fire safety work undertaken, as this is currently carried out by specialist non-station-based staff.
- The numbers of **fire safety audits/inspections** have fallen in recent years, particularly since the Grenfell Tower fire after June 2017, as new risk-based audit and inspection priorities have been introduced. Although in 2020/21 these have both started to increase again.



## Community safety

- Data for the numbers of **home fire safety visits** (HFSVs) carried out (mainly by fire station staff) and time spent on community safety activity by fire station staff is available by borough in annex 1E. The London-wide data for the last five years is in the chart below, and lower numbers in 2020/21 are due to reduced activity due to Covid-19 restrictions.
- Data for the proportion of **time spent on community safety by station-based staff** is published at borough level only in annex 1E. The London-wide data for the last five years is in the chart below. The proportion of time spent on community safety activities (including home fire safety visits) by fire station staff has largely been consistent over the five-year although fell significantly in 2020/21. Some of the reduced levels of activity in 2020/21 can be attributed to Covid-19 restrictions from March 2020.



Notes: HFSVs and 'station time' not to same scale.

# LFB performance compared to all English fire and rescue services

This review of statistics for the year 2020/21 (year ending March 2021) for fire and rescue services (FRSs) in England is published by the Home Office<sup>4</sup>. The results for England (with London added using Brigade statistics<sup>5</sup> in italics) show:

## Incidents attended by the fire and rescue service

518,263 incidents were attended by FRSs. This was a seven per cent decrease compared with the previous year (558,013), a two per cent decrease compared with five years ago (529,674) and a 20 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (647,362). The decrease in incidents attended this year compared with last year was driven by decreases in all three main incident types (fires, non-fire incidents and fire false alarms) with some elements affected by the restrictions on life imposed throughout year ending March 2021 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

- *LFB attended 96,702 incidents in 2020/21. This was an eight per cent decrease compared with the previous year (105,552), an eight per cent decrease compared with five years ago (104,741) and a 17 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (115,976).*

## Fires

FRSs attended 151,086 fires. This was two per cent decrease compared with the previous year (154,180) and a 34 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (228,412 in 2010/11). There were 61,912 primary fires, a ten per cent decrease compared with the previous year (68,771); three categories of primary fires (dwelling fires, other buildings fires and vehicle fires) showed decreases over this time, only outdoor primary fires, the smallest category of primary fire, showed an increase over this time.

- *LFB attended 16,959 fires. This was four per cent decrease compared with the previous year (17,747) and a 37 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (27,042 in 2011/12). There were 8,455 primary fires, a 12 per cent decrease compared with the previous year (9,619); three categories of primary fires (dwelling fires, other buildings fires and vehicle fires) showed decreases over this time, only outdoor primary fires, the smallest category of primary fire, showed an increase over this time.*

## False alarms

FRSs attended 216,149 fire false alarms, a seven per cent decrease compared with the previous year (231,630), a one per cent increase compared with five years ago (214,411) and a 21 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (272,179).

- *LFB attended 46,919 fire false alarms, an 11 per cent decrease compared with the previous year (52,695), a six per cent decrease compared with five years ago (49,744) and a 13 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (54,198).*

## Non-fire incidents (special services)

FRSs attended 151,028 non-fire incidents, a 12 per cent decrease compared with the previous year (172,203) and a one per cent decrease compared with five years ago (152,987).

<sup>4</sup> Fire and rescue incident statistics: England, year ending March 2021. 12 August 2021 ([Home Office](#))

<sup>5</sup> Fire Statistics Data Tables ([Home Office Data Tables](#))

- LFB attended 32,824 non-fire incidents, a seven per cent decrease compared with the previous year (35,110) and a five per cent decrease compared with five years ago (34,727).

## Fire-related fatalities

There were 240 fire-related fatalities compared with 245 in the previous year (a decrease of 2%), the lowest financial year figure since comparable data became available in year ending March 1982 and the number of fatalities has been at historically low levels in recent years. There were 186 fire-related fatalities in dwelling fires, compared with 200 in the previous year (a decrease of 7%).

- There were 34 fire-related fatalities compared with 33 in the previous year (a increase of 3%), There were 33 fire-related fatalities in dwelling fires, compared with 28 in the previous year (a increase of 18%).

## Fire-related non-fatal casualties

There were 6,347 non-fatal casualties, an eight per cent decrease compared with the 6,910 in the previous year. The lowest number of non-fatal casualties since year ending March 1982. There has been a 17 per cent decrease compared with the 7,672 non-fatal casualties five years ago and a 32 per cent decrease compared with 9,397 ten years ago.

- There were 827 non-fatal casualties, a nine per cent decrease compared with the 904 in the previous year. The lowest number of non-fatal casualties since year ending March 1982. There has been an 18 per cent decrease compared with the 1,011 non-fatal casualties five years ago and a 39 per cent decrease compared with 1,354 ten years ago.

# Notes on data

## Correction to data for earlier years

This document includes some minor corrections to some data for years before 2020/21 published to support earlier versions of the Statement of Assurance. These are minor corrections and do not materially impact on any conclusions to be drawn from the data.

## Attendance time calculation

### Fire engine response times

The way in which fire engine response times are calculated is described in the document ***Fire Facts – Incident Response Times 2020*** available on the LFB web site. In line with LSP2017, the calculation has been varied to provide greater accuracy in terms of performance. The method of calculation as described previously is set out below.

Attendance times for fire engines are measured from (a) the time an appliance is mobilised to (b) the time the appliance arrives at the incident scene. No special appliances (e.g. aerial appliances, fire rescue units) currently have published attendance times. The standard applies London-wide to any type of emergency incident.

The following criteria are used to calculate published attendance time performance:

- Arrival times for all pumping appliances regardless of location of the appliance at time of mobilisation and will include appliances from other station grounds.
- First appliance and second appliance is determined by the order of arrival at the incident, i.e. the first appliance will be the first to arrive not necessarily the first to be mobilised.
- Mobilisations included in the calculation are for:
  - Incidents in London only.
  - London pumping appliances only; pumping appliances from neighbouring brigades that attend in London are not included.

- Appliances on any mobilised attendance, including running calls, incident upgrades, additional mobilisations.
- Mobilisations where a time value is present in the data; sometimes 'time arrived' is missing due to a failure (human or technical) to record the time.
- Mobilisations are excluded where:
  - The incident is a 'shut in lift' release not attended as an emergency (i.e. not on 'blue light').
  - The calculated attendance time is greater than 20 minutes (because this generally reflects a failure (human or technical) to record a time of arrival in a timely manner).
  - The mobilisation is to a batch mobilised flooding call.
  - The mobilisation was a relief appliance for an appliance mobilised as part of the initial or upgraded attendance.
  - The attending crew has added a delay code for: 'arrival time incorrect', 'did not arrive', 'returned by stop', or attendance at 'non-emergency road speed'.

### Special appliance response times

The performance calculation for special appliance response times follows the same methodology as that for fire engine response times (as set out above), except that instead of excluding times greater than 20 minutes, the exclusion is set at 40 minutes given the expected longer arrival times for special appliances.

## **Second and third appliance average attendance performance**

Data for average **third appliance response times** is provided by ward (in annex 2A). There is no target attendance time for third appliance. In this ward data there are some cases where the third appliance response is shown with a faster time than the second appliance response. This is a function of maths. Take an example of six incidents in one ward. For each incident, the times are consistent with first faster than second and second faster than third. But when they are averaged, you get a third appliance average response time faster than second appliance, as follows:

	<b>First</b>	<b>Second</b>	<b>Third</b>
Incident 1	05:02	07:54	
Incident 2	06:32	07:21	
Incident 3	04:45	06:23	07:04
Incident 4	05:22		
Incident 5	03:13	06:48	06:57
Incident 6	05:37	10:02	
<b>Average</b>	<b>05:05</b>	<b>07:41</b>	<b>07:00</b>

## **Methodological difficulties working at ward level**

Ward level data is provided at the request of former LFEPA Members to assist with an assessment of the impact of the changes to fire stations and pumping appliances arising from the LSP5 (and after). As outlined in earlier documents, during LSP5 consultation and in the Statement of Assurance 2013/14 onwards, some caution is need in interpreting ward level data.

To summarise:

- **high level of variability in ward demand and ward response performance year-on-year.**

In 2020/21, nearly one third (31 per cent) of wards had fewer than two incidents a week (211 wards). Also, as outlined earlier, in 2020/21, nearly two thirds (58 per cent) of all incidents are attended by only one appliance. The small

number of incidents receiving more than one appliance means that ward response times, particularly where a second or third appliance are mobilised, are subject to considerable variability year-on-year. Some of the data shown for an individual ward will reflect what happened on a single occasion. In other wards it will reflect the average of what happened across a range up to 100 incidents.

- **changes to wards in three boroughs:**

Wards in three boroughs changed on 22 May 2014 in Hackney, Kensington and Chelsea and Tower Hamlets. There were also changes to wards on 3 May 2018 in Bexley, Croydon, Southwark, and Redbridge. There were 657 wards in 2018/19, and data for this report is consistently based on the wards as they were after May 2018 even for periods before the change. It is not, therefore, possible to makes a direct comparison with ward data published in this document and the data published during LSP5 consultation.

- **temporary changes due to station rebuild programmes:**

A number of boroughs and many wards in 2014/15 and 2015/16 were directly impacted by temporary station closures and the temporary removal or displacement of pumping appliances due to a station rebuilding programme. Those stations which were closed for all or part of these years, will have had a temporary impact on ward attendance times in the area. For example, during 2015/16, six stations were closed at various points during the year<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>6</sup> Dagenham, Dockhead, Leytonstone, Plaistow, Purley, and Shadwell.

## **Annex 1 | Borough data**

**Annex 1A** – First, second and third pumping appliances attendance times

**Annex 1B** – Special appliance (aerial and fire rescue unit) attendance times

**Annex 1C** – Emergency calls, incidents attended, fires, primary fires, arson (all deliberate fires), accidental dwelling fires, fires in care homes and sheltered housing

**Annex 1D** – Fire casualties (deaths and serious fire injuries).

**Annex 1E** – Fire safety – regulatory fire safety audits/inspections in premises not previously visited and in high risk premises, station time on community safety and home fire safety visits.

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## Annex 1B | Special appliance (aerial and fire rescue unit) attendance times – borough data

Borough	Fire rescue unit					Aerial appliance				
	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Barking and Dagenham	11:07	12:19	11:42	11:41	12:47	11:55	09:50	08:13	07:46	08:47
Barnet	17:29	14:32	15:43	15:58	15:34	16:30	16:45	16:13	16:25	16:05
Bexley	11:09	08:56	10:57	09:07	10:18		20:02	19:49	19:41	18:28
Brent	10:17	10:21	10:02	10:04	10:40	10:55	08:51	08:07	08:12	08:40
Bromley	14:22	14:22	13:48	15:05	14:30	14:16	12:12	13:22	12:29	13:34
Camden	09:43	09:33	10:10	08:22	09:47	07:44	07:26	07:20	06:58	07:12
City of London	10:52	09:31	11:52	13:00	12:39	09:57	09:52	08:56	09:25	09:12
Croydon	08:12	08:44	08:43	09:12	09:29	16:26	15:32	15:39	16:06	15:05
Ealing	12:33	12:33	11:17	12:23	12:50	13:22	13:13	13:21	13:24	12:23
Enfield	09:27	10:41	11:45	09:43	11:41	09:25	11:56	11:34	10:50	10:51
Greenwich	11:48	11:53	12:15	11:49	13:31	13:41	10:56	10:50	11:29	09:59
Hackney	10:31	09:27	10:15	11:05	10:10	12:41	11:09	10:53	11:00	10:07
Hammersmith and Fulham	11:40	12:28	12:07	12:19	12:26	10:54	10:00	10:35	10:22	10:20
Haringey	11:27	10:55	12:03	11:37	13:09	09:38	08:16	08:30	07:31	07:36
Harrow	13:34	12:46	12:13	12:56	13:37	11:22	12:14	12:14	11:38	12:23
Havering	17:38	17:43	19:20	16:16	19:01	08:08	09:50	09:06	10:16	10:58
Hillingdon	16:24	16:35	16:22	16:52	16:19	09:56	08:30	08:25	09:53	09:20
Hounslow	10:44	10:10	09:32	10:03	11:23	18:49	16:32	16:08	15:04	15:57
Islington	07:06	08:16	09:29	09:30	07:36	09:46	09:23	09:51	09:29	08:48
Kensington and Chelsea	08:05	08:45	09:02	09:45	08:08	09:32	09:02	08:49	08:49	08:32
Kingston upon Thames	13:18	14:49	13:51	14:15	13:57	14:12	14:00	14:18	12:23	14:08
Lambeth	11:13	11:43	12:20	11:22	11:17	07:25	07:22	07:32	07:13	07:06
Lewisham	10:24	10:30	10:40	09:39	11:11	06:53	06:39	06:59	06:48	06:33
Merton	09:25	11:21	08:45	10:52	09:45	04:57	06:08	06:59	05:32	07:29
Newham	10:17	10:33	09:59	10:56	10:34	18:16	17:47	16:57	17:12	16:24
Redbridge	13:06	12:28	12:44	13:32	13:24	13:02	13:22	12:17	12:49	12:28
Richmond upon Thames	13:03	14:10	12:25	15:10	14:14	14:32	16:05	16:14	19:42	14:42
Southwark	13:52	12:24	12:22	12:24	12:12	07:32	06:52	06:51	06:52	06:55
Sutton	11:39	11:54	12:10	11:13	11:49	13:22	11:54	12:06	11:01	11:58
Tower Hamlets	11:09	09:08	09:36	09:22	09:03	12:17	12:37	12:40	13:14	12:22
Waltham Forest	13:04	12:43	13:38	14:16	15:39	08:07	13:19	12:12	11:36	10:53
Wandsworth	09:39	09:45	09:59	10:00	08:54	08:40	08:20	08:00	08:36	08:23
Westminster	08:44	08:57	09:27	09:30	10:00	06:43	06:21	06:15	06:06	05:45
	<b>11:24</b>	<b>11:19</b>	<b>11:28</b>	<b>11:30</b>	<b>11:42</b>	<b>08:33</b>	<b>08:35</b>	<b>08:37</b>	<b>08:33</b>	<b>08:24</b>

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021 with a cut-off of 40 minutes

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021 with a cut-off of 40 minutes



## Annex 1D | Fire casualties (deaths and serious fire injuries) – borough data

Borough	Fire deaths (all)					Deaths in accidental fires in the home					Serious fire injuries				
	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Barking and Dagenham	3	0	2	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	25	14	15	6	13
Barnet	0	2	1	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	19	40	18	29	8
Bexley	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	21	9	12	8	15
Brent	1	1	1	2	4	1	0	1	0	2	25	37	15	16	28
Bromley	2	1	0	2	1	2	1	0	0	1	10	10	22	32	12
Camden	3	2	3	1	1	3	1	2	1	1	12	9	12	13	13
City of London	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Croydon	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	25	25	31	35	18
Ealing	3	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	33	21	31	29	24
Enfield	1	2	4	0	1	1	1	2	0	1	23	21	22	14	9
Greenwich	3	0	2	1	4	2	0	1	1	1	16	13	20	15	21
Hackney	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	1	2	0	16	22	24	21	10
Hammersmith and Fulham	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	16	35	14	16	9
Haringey	3	3	3	0	0	2	2	3	0	0	11	20	20	12	16
Harrow	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	13	10	16	7	6
Havering	3	1	0	1	1	3	1	0	0	1	10	17	19	12	10
Hillingdon	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	16	23	18	10	14
Hounslow	1	0	2	2	0	1	0	2	2	0	11	19	22	14	20
Islington	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	23	23	25	18	12
Kensington and Chelsea	0	73	3	0	2	0	73	2	0	2	17	97	8	10	10
Kingston upon Thames	1	3	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	5	7	4	2	4
Lambeth	3	2	1	2	0	3	2	1	2	0	20	15	20	9	21
Lewisham	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	20	28	30	29	16
Merton	1	0	1	2	1	1	0	1	2	0	10	11	8	9	7
Newham	2	0	0	1	3	2	0	0	0	3	15	38	26	6	22
Redbridge	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	22	5	24	8	13
Richmond upon Thames	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	7	6	10	2
Southwark	3	0	0	2	1	2	0	0	2	1	23	20	22	14	14
Sutton	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	10	20	9	14	9
Tower Hamlets	0	1	0	1	2	0	1	0	1	2	12	18	16	17	11
Waltham Forest	1	2	3	0	1	1	2	1	0	1	18	10	17	16	11
Wandsworth	3	2	1	3	1	2	2	1	3	1	24	20	17	25	18
Westminster	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	16	21	23	16	17
	44	108	40	33	31	39	100	26	23	23	542	686	587	492	433

Note: All deaths at fires where the cause was the fire or smoke.

Note: All deaths at an accidental fire in the home (dwelling) where the cause was the fire or smoke.

Note: Serious injuries at fires that required medical attention at hospital (either slight or serious, but excluding precautionary checks and first aid at scene).



## **Annex 2 | Ward data**

**Annex 2A** – Appliance attendance times: first, second and third pumping appliances, aerial appliances, fire rescue units.

**Annex 2B** – Incidents, fires, dwelling fires, fires in care homes and sheltered housing, fire deaths and serious fire injuries.

The annex 2 data is within the excel document named Annex 2 - Ward Data - 2020-21

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