



LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Decision title

## Review of Operational Debriefing Procedures

Recommendation by Assistant Commissioner, Operational Policy and Assurance Decision Number LFC- 0385-D

Protective marking: **NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED**

Publication status: Published in full

### Summary

In response to the recommendations from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), Report LFC- 0385 outlines the structure and approach taken by Operational Policy & Assurance to review the effectiveness of our operational debriefing procedures.

Report LFC-0385 covers the London Fire Brigade's current methods of debriefing following incidents or training scenarios, ongoing pilots of hot debriefs and operations debriefs. It also outlines the plan to complete the review and deliver improvements for both individual development and organisational learning that aligns with National Operational Guidance.

### Decision

That the London Fire Commissioner notes the content of this report.

**Andy Roe**  
London Fire Commissioner

Date **This decision was remotely signed on Monday 21 September 2020**

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LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Report title

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## Review of Operational Debriefing Procedures

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Report to	Date
Operational Delivery DB	01 July 2020
Corporate Services DB	07 July 2020
Commissioner's Board	16 July 2020
Deputy Mayor's Fire and Resilience Board	18 August 2020

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Report by	Report number
Assistant Commissioner, Operational Policy and Assurance	LFC-0385

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### Summary

In response to the recommendations from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), this interim report outlines the structure and approach taken by Operational Policy & Assurance (OP&A) to review the effectiveness of our operational debriefing procedures. The report covers our current methods of debriefing following incidents or training scenarios, ongoing pilots of hot debriefs and operations debriefs. It also outlines the plan to complete the review and deliver improvements for both individual development and organisational learning that aligns with National Operational Guidance.

### Recommendation

That the London Fire Commissioner notes the content of this report.

### Background

1. The HMICFRS report stated that, 'The brigade should make sure its system for learning from operational debriefs is effective and that staff understand how to record learning from operational incidents'. They went on to say that despite the processes and technological systems being good that the staff commentary from incident monitoring and operational debriefs is inconsistent. The report also indicated that not all staff felt that the tone of the Brigade's debriefs supported a learning environment.
2. Following this report Operational Assurance and Policy have set up a review of our operational debriefing procedures and have already taken significant steps to identify the underlying context behind the HMICFRS findings. There are no doubt deep seated cultural issues behind some of the comments made by staff to produce the above outcome. This review will seek to identify and understand those issues through analysis of data, extensive staff engagement, research into other organisations and trialling of new approaches.
3. Background guidance and direction is provided through National Operational Guidance (NOG) which provides strategic and tactical actions for fire and rescue services (FRS) to follow. The review will also focus on our own current operational incident debriefing policies - Policy Note

(PN) 0417 Performance Review of Operations (PRO) and PN 0421 Performance Review of Command (PRC).

4. In addition, this review gives the organisation the opportunity to look at our systems and ensure they provide the accurate and relevant data that allows for scrutiny and analysis. These systems should ensure clear trends and underlying issues to be identified that contribute to organisational improvement processes.

### **The structure and content of the review**


5. A significant amount of research is required to fully understand the underlying issues related to our debriefing processes. Once this research has been carried out and the review has been completed, a future report (Feb 2021) will provide recommendations to make improvements to operational debriefing procedures. These recommendations will align to the four strategic pillars of the transformational delivery plan and drive cultural change, continuous improvement and performance within the organisation. The structure and content of the review will;
  - Carry out a gap analysis with National Operational Guidance (NOG) and our own policies in relation to debriefing following incidents and training events and detail the findings of that gap analysis.
  - Carry out extensive staff engagement through focus groups, meetings and surveys to ascertain their views and feelings.
  - Review current training provision in relation to debriefing, particularly that provided to staff who facilitate debriefs.
  - Initiate an internal stakeholder group to share the findings of the operational staff survey on debriefing and establish what the results identify, particularly in relation to cultural issues.
  - Review systems to ensure appropriate provision and format of data that allows effective analysis in line with organisational assurance.
  - Research good practice by engaging with other FRS and external organisations to determine established methods of debriefing and how effective they are for a particular organisation.
  - Pilot and provide evaluation on different approaches to debriefs such as hot debriefs, operations debrief and command reviews. Use the findings to provide options for the improvements and change of our overall organisational processes.
  - Implement approved changes and instigate a continual evaluation process.

### **An overview and analysis of our current debriefing procedures**


6. In the last year there have been 2,258 incidents that have met the necessary requirements for a mandatory PRO which equates to all make up incidents and incidents that involve persons reported or trapped. The PRO process is to ascertain the efficiency and effectiveness of individual, team, procedural and equipment performance at operational incidents and simulations. A PRO can be undertaken at any other incident or training event that an IC or MO considers beneficial.

7. Currently, PROs are made up of an informal and a formal debrief. The informal part of the process is carried out on the incident ground and can be facilitated by a sub officer (SubO). NOG states, 'Whenever possible, the incident commander should debrief crews prior to leaving the incident'. When an incident is over 4 pumps, a formal PRO should be undertaken at a venue away from the incident and is facilitated by a station commander (SC) that did not attend. This is to provide a degree of neutrality and objectivity. Due to the exigencies of the Brigade the majority of formal PROs are held on a night duty.
8. All outcomes of the PROs should be recorded on the incident monitoring performance database (IMPD). In a random sample of 75 entries on the IMPD over the last 12 months, 73 (performance) entries were deemed to be 'as expected' and did not have any comments attached. The PROs may have been beneficial to those that attended, but there was no meaningful individual or organisational learning added to the IMPD. There may be several reasons for this:
  - The incident or training event did not identify any individual, team or organisational learning.
  - The facilitation of the PRO (informal & formal) did not lend itself to the participants speaking freely in a manner that sought to discuss what went well, what did not go so well and what can we do next time to improve.
  - At the time of the review there was no official guidance for the informal PRO (also known as a hot debrief) which is usually delegated to a junior officer at the scene. This could result in a lack of structure or set objectives which can lead to verbal re-run of the incident without identifying any organisational learning.
9. The Performance Review of Command (PN 421) states, 'The PRC is an analytical process that allows incident commanders and monitoring officers to discuss, review, analyse and evaluate all aspects of their period in command'. It also details that PRCs are to be given 'high priority' to make sure that where possible it is completed within 28 days of the incident. The following paragraphs (12- 16) analyse the PRC data that is available.
10. Table 1 below shows a status breakdown of PRCs over the last 5 quarters.

**Table 1: Numerical breakdown of PRCs**



11. The following graph shows the percentage of PRCs that are **not** completed within the target of 28 days stated in PN 412 for the same period of time:



12. Table 2 below shows further details on when PRCs were completed. Q2's higher number of cancelled PRCs may reflect the larger number of grass fires experienced during this quarter.

**Table 2: Breakdown of completion timescales for PRCs in 2019/20**

Q1-2019/20		Q2-2019/20		Q3-2019/20		Q4-2019/20	
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>Cancelled</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Cancelled</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>Cancelled</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Cancelled</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Under 28 days</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>Under 28 days</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>Under 28 days</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>Under 28 days</b>	<b>0%</b>
<b>29-56 days</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>29-56 days</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>29-56 days</b>	<b>31%</b>	<b>29-56 days</b>	<b>75%</b>
<b>57-100 days</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>57-100 days</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>57-100 days</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>57-100 days</b>	<b>0%</b>
<b>Over 100 days</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>Over 100 days</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>Over 100 days</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>Over 100 days</b>	<b>25%</b>

13. Table 3 shows that the number of PRCs has increased over the last three years by fifty six (39%), which has an effect on the resources required to stage a debrief. There could be a number of reasons that contribute to this increase, for example, increase in the number of grass fires, implementation of NOG compliant BA procedures or a culmination of these and other factors.

**Table 3: The breakdown of PRCs by incident size**

2019/20		2018/19		2017/18	
4 Appliances	1	4 Appliances	4	4 Appliances	1
6	110	6	82	6	95
8	38	8	39	8	16
10	26	10	38	10	18
12	15	12	6	12	7
15	8	15	10	15	4
20	1	20	7	20	1
25	1	40	1	40	1
PRC trigger at 6 Pumps	199	PRC trigger at 6 Pumps	184	PRC trigger at 6 Pumps	143
If PRC trigger at 8 Pumps	89	If PRC trigger at 8 Pumps	103	If PRC trigger at 8 Pumps	55


14. Table 4 shows individual positive and development points over the last four quarters and the amount that were awarded at PRCs. The values are expressed as the ratio of the total amount awarded with the percentage figure in brackets. The remaining points were awarded before the PRC i.e. either at or around the time of the incident or at the PRO.

**Table 4: IMPD positive and development comments**

	Q1 – 2019/20	Q2 – 2019/20	Q3 -2019/20	Q4 – 2019/20
Individual positive entries awarded at PRCs	6 from a possible 138 (4.5%)	4 from a possible 169 (2.5%)	3 from a possible 133 (2.5%)	0 from a possible 139 (0%)
Individual development entries awarded at PRCs	9 from a possible 39 (23%)	16 from a possible 55 (29%)	11 from a possible 36 (30.5%)	3 from a possible 43 (7%)

15. Q4's data does not assist in presenting an accurate overall picture due to the fact that in 2019/20 there were only 5 PRCs recorded as opposed to 35 in the same period last year. Much of this is due to the social distancing restrictions in place because of COVID-19. The remaining data illustrates that between 2.5% – 4.5% of IMP positive comments over the last 3 quarters were awarded at the time of the PRC. This indicates that the vast majority are recognised and placed on the database far closer to the time of the incident. In comparison between 23% and 30.5% of IMP development comments were awarded at PRCs as opposed to nearer the time of the incident. The graph in paragraph 12 underlines the fact that in the last 5 quarters, between 85% and 100% of PRCs are not being conducted within the 28 day time period.
16. Table 4 highlights that far more positive comments are made outside of the PRC process and proportionally more development comments are made within the PRC process. Notably, the figures also highlight that overall far more positive comments are entered onto the database than development points. This may suggest a cultural issue of officers willingly delivering the perceived 'good' news but reticent to deliver 'bad' news which may support further comments from HMICFRS (under the heading of Effectiveness) which stated that, 'the inconsistent commentary from incident monitoring and debriefing events, ...hinders opportunities for the brigade to learn from incidents'.
17. This presents a risk to the organisation in recording individual development in a timely manner and is referenced by NOG in ensuring workplace competence is maintained.
18. To determine operational staff's perceptions on both current structures and future improvements, a PRC survey has been developed (appendix 1). This has been made available to all operational officers from Leading Fire Fighter (LFF) to Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) and closed on the 4 June 2020. It consisted of eight questions with fixed choice answers and a ninth question that gives an opportunity to write any other thoughts regarding the PRC process. Almost 200 responses were received and initial analysis presents a mixed picture with some positive comments and some less positive. However, a large majority of the responses incorporated comments with suggestions for improvements and these are now being reviewed along with a deeper analysis of the results.
19. In February 2020 the term 'professional discussion' replaced 'informal action'. The alternate use of professional discussion enables officers to record that developmental or positive recognition conversations have taken place with individuals and that no further intervention is required i.e. the outcome is not recorded as a development point and does not generate a Personal Development Plan (PDP). It is hoped this will encourage increased entries that cover low level informal discussions at the scene which in turn assist in trend analysis. Table 5 compares the data entered by officers from quarter 3 & 4 2018/19 and the same quarters from 2019/20 after the addition of the professional discussion option.

**Table 5: Professional Discussion**



20. Of the 73 professional discussion entries made 35 were developmental and 38 positive. Individual entries have decreased by an overall 102 entries, with a 24% reduction in positive entries and a 17% reduction in developmental entries. This can be perhaps explained by a 50% reduction in PRCs compared to the same time last year, COVID-19 pandemic in Q4 being a possible contributor to this. Its still relatively early to fully assess the impact of the introduction of the Professional discussion so this will be reviewed again at the end of Q1 2020/21.

21. Taking the above data and analysis into account, the current COVID-19 situation presented an opportunity to trial a new approach to PROs. Therefore on 9 April, a three month trial began to look at a new way of facilitating post incident debriefs. This approach focuses on the informal (hot debrief) and formal (operations debrief) debrief process.

22. The trial procedures were designed and based on NOG good practice. Facilitators of (informal) hot debriefs, that take place on the incident ground, now have an aide memoire to add structure and help aide consistency to these events. The formal PROs have been replaced with an operations debrief that enables more detailed responses, gathered back at station in a potentially 'safer' watch environment where people maybe more open to expressing their views. The feedback is then submitted via email to the initial station commander (SC). These responses are then collated by the SC and a summary sent back to crews to enable all views to be shared with watches. Learning is recorded on the IMPD with a renewed aim to complete this process within 28 days. The results of this trial are currently being analysed and incorporated into the overall review. Further details of the hot debrief and operations debrief are contained in Appendices 1-3.

### **Research into other organisations**

23. Throughout this review, consultation with other fire rescue services (FRS) continues to take place. Membership of a National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) assurance working group has enabled sharing of information, ideas and lessons learned. This has also served to illustrate the



common systemic and cultural challenges around the country in effective debriefing as it appears that no one FRS has the utopian 'culture'.

24. In addition to engagement with other FRS, the review has also taken into account systems employed by fellow blue light partners. The National College of Policing (NCoP) have a debriefing model that is used by several other FRS. This model places much of the emphasis for the debriefs success on the facilitator nurturing an environment that encourages open and honest participation by all attendees. Unfortunately, due the current pandemic, several opportunities to observe/participate in debriefs run by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) licensed facilitators had to be postponed. Dialogue has continued over this time and new dates will be organised as soon as possible.
25. Contact has been made with the London Ambulance Service and London Air Ambulance (LAA) to share good practice. A strong learning ethos within the LAA teams is something that is encouraged by all team members. Debriefing events concentrate on all areas in detail to enable individual and team performance to be identified within the group. When attending a debrief, at the forefront of the staff's mind was personal improvement. NOG state that while information is useful in how things could be done in future, '...learning has only truly been achieved when some form of change is actually implemented that ensures actions will be different in future'.
26. Other organisations outside of the emergency sector were approached in order to explore alternative debriefing ideas. Interviews with director level management at Interserve, Sir Robert McAlpine and Danone UK have increased awareness of alternative working sectors. Although the frequency of structured debriefing events was generally lower than that of the Brigade, all the organisations placed high importance on the people facilitating the events in order to establish more efficient, safer performance in future. They also noted the challenge for the Brigade of maintaining a consistent standard of facilitation with so many incident debriefs taking place.
27. Other research areas worthy of note include the industries that are employing a 'Just Culture'. Aviation, train transportation, nuclear power and the health care industry have employed this culture to satisfy demands for accountability and contribute to learning and improvement. At the core of discussions around this area has been whether to blame or not. This has sometimes taken the emphasis from the main objectives which are to prevent repeat events and treat people fairly during the process.
28. Good practice aspects from the above research into other organisations processes will be considered when formulating any new approaches to debriefing that maybe adopted following this review.

### **Review Timeline**

29. In order to meet the milestones the organisation has set itself to deliver the improvements expected against the HMICFRS expectations, the table below sets out the timeline for the review.

<b>Action</b>	<b>Timeline</b>
Review relevant policies and carry our gap analysis against NOG	Dec 2019 – February 2020
Research into underlying context and cultural issues through staff engagement and data analysis	February – April 2020
Trial new approach to PROs	April – July 2020
Interim report for governance boards.	July 2020
Analyse the results from the PRC survey and PRO trial  Review current training provision related to debriefing processes.  Incorporate research from other organisations  Review systems and data that support debriefing processes	June – Aug 2020
Consider options and trial new approaches to debriefing processes	September – Dec 2020
Analyse trials and new approaches	Jan 2021
Final report to governance boards with recommendations for change.	Feb 2021
Produce revised policy and training	March – May 2021
Implement new approach to debriefing	May 2021

30. It should be noted that staff will be kept updated about progress on the review via Hotwire, Managers Update and Operational News.

#### **Finance comments**

31. This report provides an update on the ongoing review of Operational Debriefing Procedures. The report notes that a further report to DB/CB will be prepared in February 2021. That subsequent report may result in additional resource requirements such as training, which will be considered as part of that report.

#### **Workforce comments**

32. Any policy changes resulting from this review will go through normal consultation procedures at the BJCHSW/JCMM/JCF as appropriate.

## **Legal comments**

33. Under section 9 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the London Fire Commissioner (the "Commissioner") is established as a corporation sole with the Mayor appointing the occupant of that office. Under section 327D of the GLA Act 1999, as amended by the Policing and Crime Act 2017, the Mayor may issue to the Commissioner specific or general directions as to the manner in which the holder of that office is to exercise his or her functions.
34. Section 1 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (the FRSA 2004) states that the Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for Greater London.
35. When carrying out its functions, the Commissioner, as the fire and rescue authority for Greater London, is required to 'have regard to the Fire and Rescue National Framework prepared by the Secretary of State (FRSA 2004, section 21).
36. Section 28 of the FRSA 2004 empowers the Home Secretary to appoint inspectors of fire and rescue authorities. In 2017 the Home Secretary appointed Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) as inspectors of fire and rescue authorities under this section and HMIC changed their name to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). The Policing and Crime Act 2017 sets out that HMICFRS will inspect and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of fire and rescue authorities in England.
37. Section 28A sets out that the inspection programme and framework requires the approval of the Home Secretary before the inspectors act in accordance with it; that the Home Secretary may, at any time, require us to carry out an inspection of a fire and rescue authority in England, all fire and rescue authorities in England, or all fire and rescue authorities in England of a particular type; that the HMICFRS may also carry out an inspection of a fire and rescue authority in England even though that inspection has not been set out in an inspection programme and the Home Secretary has not required them to do it.
38. HMICFRS is an inspectorate, and has powers to secure information, but no powers to give orders for change.
39. It is for the London Fire Commissioner, subject to the oversight arrangements in place from the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Greater London Assembly and Home Secretary, to take action as a result of HMICFRS's recommendations. This report details proposed actions that the Commissioner will take to address issues raised in the HMICFRS report.

## **Sustainability implications**

40. Not required for Board report but noted that:
  - If Operations Debrief is taken forward beyond trial as a permanent change, perhaps scale of reduced vehicle movements could be included in full report.
  - No other implications of note.

## **Equalities implications**

41. The London Fire Commissioner and decision takers are required to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (s149 of the Equality Act 2010) when exercising our functions and taking decisions.
42. It is important to note that consideration of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not a one-off task. The duty must be fulfilled before taking a decision, at the time of taking a decision, and after the decision has been taken.

43. The protected characteristics are: Age, Disability, Gender reassignment, Pregnancy and maternity, Marriage and civil partnership (but only in respect of the requirements to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination), Race (ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality), Religion or belief (including lack of belief), Sex, and Sexual orientation.
44. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires us, in the exercise of all LFC functions (i.e. everything the LFC does), to have due regard to the need to:
- (a) Eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct.
  - (b) Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
  - (c) Foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.
45. Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to:
- (a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic where those disadvantages are connected to that characteristic;
  - (b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;
  - (c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.
46. The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include, in particular, steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities.
47. Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—
- (a) tackle prejudice, and
  - (b) promote understanding.
48. An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) was undertaken on 9 June 2020.
49. The impact assessment found a positive impact around disability. The review has the potential to identify improved ways of undertaking the PRC/PRO processes which should take into consideration individuals learning styles. The gathering of information at the operations debrief (currently formal PRO) will be in smaller groups in staff's own watch and station. This could encourage increased participation and sharing of opinions with the benefits of smaller group working rather than in larger groups.
50. The new hot debrief and operations review aide memoires note mental health considerations and refer to PN 0915 (Recognising and coping with potentially traumatic events).
51. Equalities Impact Assessment analysed with the following comments:
- Did the data collection from IMS note any comments around under represented groups?

- Did the PRC survey results data indicate any areas around under represented groups?
- A suggestion to consult with Equality Support Groups.

All of the above have been discussed in detail and all comments received will be addressed before the final report. A formation of a task and finish group will include a representative from People Services and agreement sought before final decisions made around the new procedures that will be trialled before implementation.

### List of Appendices

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1.	PRC Survey	
2.	Debriefing Guidance	
3.	Hot Debrief	
4.	Operations Debrief	

**PRC Survey Questions**

**1.** The most difficult aspect of arranging a PRC within 28 days for the initial Station Commander is...

The availability of the required OIC attendees

The availability of the Chair or ORT officer

The availability of a suitable venue

The putting together of the PRC pack

**2.** As a participant in the PRC process, I view the current experience as a good way of increasing my operational awareness and incident command skills.

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**3.** The current PRC format is time efficient and used effectively to review good command and control practice.

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**4.** Both positive and developmental points (with subsequent PDPs), are used effectively to enhance an individual's performance.

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**5.** Being awarded a development point at a PRC is something to be avoided.

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**6.** The awarding of positive and development points is the best way to recognise individual performance?

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**7.** PRCs' are conducted with a genuine focus on learning and understanding operational decision making in a learning environment.

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**8.** After self reflection, I can see advantages in recognising my own development areas at the PRC, and working on them with the most suitable person(s).

Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree or disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

**9.** Any further comments on improving the current PRC system?

## Debriefing Guidance

### Interim Operational Debrief Guidance

#### Hot Debrief (PRO at the incident)

The purpose of a Hot Debrief (Informal PRO) and an Operations Debrief (Formal PRO) is to facilitate feedback around the performance of individuals, teams and the Brigades procedures and equipment with the express aim of learning and making improvements in the operational arena.

A Hot Debrief can be undertaken following any incident or training event, however, one must take place following:

All 'make up' incidents

Incidents that involve 'persons reported' or 'persons confirmed trapped'

The aide memoire for a Hot Debrief should be printed and carried on all front line appliances for use at the scene by the facilitating officer. A flowchart showing the debrief process is on the reverse.

#### Operations Debrief (Formal PRO remote from the incident)

The interim Operations Debrief procedure requires the initial Station Commander (SC) to gather the relevant information from the attending appliance officers via email. This method is replacing the current 'Formal PRO' and is being trialled until further notice.

Appliance commanders should speak to their crews about potential areas of learning (what went well, what didn't go so well) as soon as possible after the incident and send the information by annotating the aide memoire and emailing it back to the initial SC. The Operations Debrief aide memoire will help officers with the structure and facilitation of the debrief.

All information is then collated by the SC who can add their own comments to the final version. A summarised version of all the feedback should then be emailed back to the officers of all the attending appliances. This will enable all the information and learning to be delivered to their watches as a training event.

This method will support watch officers to actively debrief their own crews, generating valuable feedback in an open, honest and safe environment.

The Operations Debrief should take place within two tours of the incident to enable accurate recollection of events.

Organisational 'positive' or 'development' points are to be detailed by the SC on the form prior to sending back to all officers. These will then be placed on IMPD by the SC.

The data from all comments made on the IMPD is analysed quarterly and directly influences organisational change.



**Hot Debrief**

A Hot Debrief can be undertaken following any incident or training event. Please note:

- A Hot Debrief must take place at all 'make up' incidents
- Incidents that involve 'persons reported' or 'persons trapped'
- The Incident Commander will take the facilitator role for the Hot Debrief (at scene)
- Facilitator to use the DMM to aid discussion as required
- Incidents of five pumps or above must also hold an Operations Debrief (Formal PRO)


Areas to include:- Individual, team, procedural and equipment performance.

Are any other services able to attend debrief to enhance collaboration?

A check list for the facilitator has been created below:

<b>Any injuries/everybody fit and well? Is there potential for trauma/welfare considerations? (PN 915 Recognising and coping with potentially traumatic events).</b>	
<b>Brief synopsis of incident, information gathering, MDT and subsequent plan.</b>	
<b>From initial crews – priorities, hazards &amp; control measures, tasks and actions.</b>	
<b>Actions by subsequent oncoming crews. Other emergency services present?</b>	
<b>Were policies supportive and clear? Any suggestions on improvements?</b>	
<b>Did all the operational and personal protective equipment function as intended?</b>	
<b>Were any organisational training issues highlighted?</b>	
<b>Community safety opportunities? HFSVs'?</b>	
<b>Any learning from the relief implementation if applicable.</b>	
<b>What would we do differently? Would a further operational debrief be beneficial?</b>	
<b>Entries to be made on IMP database by Incident Commander?</b>	







**Interim Operations Debrief Aide Memoire(Formal PRO)**

<b>Date of Incident</b>	
<b>Incident Number</b>	
<b>Address</b>	
<b>Station &amp; Borough</b>	

1	Are all personnel fit and well following the incident? (PN 519 Recognising and coping with potentially traumatic events).
2	What were you called to and which appliances were mobilised at this time?
3	Were there any communications en-route? This includes main scheme and hand held radios and between you and your crew?
4	Did you use the MDT to access the ORD?
5	On arrival, briefly describe initial actions and subsequent plan.
6	What were your priorities, tasks and actions?
7	Identify any hazards to crews, members of the public and control measures that were present.
8	What actions did the oncoming crews take?
9	Were other agencies in attendance at the incident? Did they compliment JESIP?
10	Did you find the safe systems of work based on brigade policies supportive and clear? Any suggestions or improvements in this area?
11	Did all the operational and personal protective equipment function as intended?
12	Were any organisational training issues highlighted?
13	What would you do or like to see done differently next time?
14	Do you have any organisational entries to be entered on the IMPD? (SC to confirm following collating of information).



