LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Report title

Railway Procedures

Report to	
Commissioner's Board	15 January 2020
Safety and Assurance DB	24 October 2019
Operations DB	21 November 2019

Report by	Report number
Assistant Commissioner, Operational Resilience & Special Operations	LFC-0291

Protective marking: **NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED**

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Summary

The report seeks approval of the revised Railway Procedures Policy (316) attached at Appendix 1. It has been materially changed to reflect changes in the railway infrastructure and safety measure. The significant changes remove unnecessary detail with a focus on generic risks and procedures that should be adopted for railway incidents.

Recommended decision

That the London Fire Commissioner

i. Approves the revised Railway Procedures Policy (PN 316) attached at Appendix 1 for implementation.

ii. Notes the EIA attached at Appendix 2.

Background

1. Railway Procedures Policy (316), has been rewritten following review, to address changes in railway infrastructure and to improve safety. The policy is designed to provide guidance for operational personnel attending incidents on or near the rail infrastructure, buildings and rolling stock. The policy has incorporated updated procedures by Network Rail (NR) and London Underground Ltd (LUL) relevant to the fire service response. This policy has been written by the Transport and Infrastructure Liaison Team in discussion with NR and TfL. There has been consultations with other stakeholders across the organisation through the Heads of Services and including Operational Policy, BJCHSW, Equalities and further details are captured in the sections below.

2. The material changes in the Policy of note are:

- Significantly decrease specific rail provider procedures information and focuses on generic processes.

- The introduction of a Competent Person within the power isolation process.

- Incorporates new railway infrastructure and procedures.

3. The policy will ensure operational effectiveness when dealing with emergencies on the railway.

Finance comments

4. There are no additional financial implications from the implementation of this policy and any cost that may arise is expected to be met within existing resources.

Workforce comments

5. The policy was presented at BJCHSW on 15th August 2019 where the changes were noted and agreed.

Legal comments

6. The report seeks approval of the Railway Procedures Policy Number 316 attached at Appendix 1. The report author confirms the policy was reviewed by the Transport and Infrastructure Liaison Team within Operational Resilience & Special Operations Group, and has included consultation with NR and LUL, together with other stakeholders across the organisation addressing matters including and not limited to health & safety issues and equality impact.

7. Part 4 (Delegation to Officers) of the London Fire Commissioner's Scheme of Governance requires all new polices and policies that have been substantively changed be approved by the Commissioner.

8. The London Fire Commissioner has the functions of the fire and rescue authority for the Greater London area under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, and must secure that the London Fire and Rescue Service is efficient and effective. The London Fire and Rescue Service means the personnel, services, and equipment secured by the London Fire Commissioner for the purpose of the carrying out of the Commissioner's functions (fire safety, fire-fighting, road traffic accidents, and relevant other emergencies). In addition, the London Fire Commissioner may do anything it considers appropriate for the purposes of carrying out any of its functional purposes. The implementation of the policy set out in Appendix 1 will secure continuous improvement in the way the London Fire Brigade undertakes its functions and ensures it will remain efficient and effective.

Sustainability implications

9. The policy was sent on the 13th Feb 2019 to sustainable development. It was found that there are no sustainability implications.

Equalities implications

10. The London Fire Commissioner and decision takers are required to have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (s149 of the Equality Act 2010) when taking decisions. This in broad terms

involves understanding the potential impact of policy and decisions on different people, taking this into account and then evidencing how decisions were reached.

11. It is important to note that consideration of the Public Sector Equality Duty is not a one-off task. The duty must be fulfilled before taking a decision, at the time of taking a decision, and after the decision has been taken.

12. The protected characteristics are: Age, Disability, Gender reassignment, Pregnancy and maternity, Marriage and civil partnership (but only in respect of the requirements to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination), Race (ethnic or national origins, colour or nationality), Religion or belief (including lack of belief), Sex, Sexual orientation.

13. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires us, in the exercise of all our functions (i.e. everything we do), to have due regard to the need to:

    (a) Eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other prohibited conduct.

    (b) Advance equality of opportunity between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.

    (c) Foster good relations between people who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.

14. Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to:

    (a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic where those disadvantages are connected to that characteristic;

    (b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it (;

    (c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.

15. The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include, in particular, steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities.

16. Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—

    (a) tackle prejudice, and

    (b) promote understanding.

17. An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) was undertaken on 19th November 2019. The impact assessment found neutral impacts identified and no were steps taken to mitigate these.

14. List of Appendices

Appendix	Title	Protective Marking
1.	Policy 316 Railway Procedures	Official
2.	Equality impact assessment	Official

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Railway Procedures

New policy number:	**316**
Old instruction number:	
Issue date:	**2018**
Reviewed as current:	
Owner:	**Head of Operational Resilience & Special Operations Group**
Responsible work team:	**Transport & Infrastructure Liaison Team**

Contents

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1 Introduction

1.1 This policy is designed to provide guidance for operational personnel attending incidents on or near the rail infrastructure, buildings and rolling stock.

2 Railway Operators & Infrastructure

2.1 Within its boundaries London Fire Brigade (LFB) has the largest concentration of railway infrastructure in the UK.

2.2 Each rail network have different methods of operating and managing their infrastructure.

2.3 This document provides guidance for operational staff so that they can recognise the different transport management systems. This will enable them to better understand the capabilities of the different operators to support crews during an incident.

London Underground network and Transport for London

2.4 The London Underground is a public transport system serving London and some parts of the adjacent counties of Buckinghamshire, Essex and Hertfordshire.

2.5 London Underground's 11 lines total 250 miles in length, making it the third longest metro system in the world. These are made up of the sub-surface network and the deep-tube lines. The Circle, District, Hammersmith & City, and Metropolitan lines form the sub-surface network, with railway tunnels just below the surface and of a similar size to those on British main lines. The Bakerloo, Central, Jubilee, Northern, Piccadilly, Victoria and Waterloo & City lines are deep-level tubes, with smaller trains that run in two circular tunnels with a diameter approximately 3.56 m.

2.6 55 per cent of the transport system runs on the surface. There are 20 miles of cut-and-cover tunnel and 93 miles of tube tunnel.

2.7 The lines are electrified with a four-rail DC system (see paragraph 4.13) a conductor rail between the rails is energised at –210 V and a rail outside the running rails at +420 V, giving a difference of 630 V. On the sections of line shared with mainline trains, such as the District line from East Putney to Wimbledon and Gunnersbury to Richmond, and the Bakerloo line north of Queen's Park, the centre rail is bonded to the running rails.

2.8 LUL manages the operation of the trains and maintenance of the infrastructure.

2.9 Transport for London (TfL) who oversees the London Underground network, manages and operates the DLR (DLR) which is an automated light metro system. It reaches north to Stratford, south to Lewisham across the River Thames, west to Tower Gateway and Bank in the City of London financial district, and east to Beckton, London City Airport, and to Woolwich Arsenal south of the river.

2.10 During an incident on the London underground, LUL will provide specialist support in the form of Station Supervisors (see section 7.26) or London Underground Emergency Response Unit (ERU) (see section 7.30).

Network Rail (NR)

2.11 NR is the owner and infrastructure manager of most of the rail network in England, Scotland and Wales. This includes approximately 330 stations within the Greater London area.

2.12 NR owns the infrastructure, including the railway tracks, signals, overhead wires, tunnels, bridges, level crossings and most stations, but not the passenger or commercial freight rolling stock. It however, owns a fleet of departmental stock used for maintaining the rail infrastructure.

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2.13 The passenger and commercial freight rolling stock are owned and managed by individual Train Operating Companies (TOC).

2.14 Management and operation of most of the stations in London is carried out by the principal train operating company serving that station. NR manages and operates 11 of the largest stations within London. These are London Bridge, Charing Cross, Paddington, Waterloo, Victoria, Liverpool Street, Clapham Junction, Cannon Street, St Pancreas, Kings cross and Euston.

2.15 NR will mobilise a Railway Incident Officer (RIO) (see section7.29) to all incidents affecting the railway. Their role is to liaise with and advise the Incident Commander (IC)on safety issues relating to Brigade personnel working on/or adjacent to the rail track.

Heathrow Express

2.16 Heathrow Express is an airport rail link between London Heathrow Airport and Paddington. It is operated by the Great Western Railway

2.17 The Heathrow Express is a high speed overhead electrified (25kV AC) rail link between Paddington station and Heathrow terminal stations

2.18 The system is operated from a control room sited in the central terminal area and includes monitoring and control facilities to oversee operations of Heathrow Express. In the event of an incident on the system, there is a facility for a fire brigade officer to attend the central control room for command/liaison purposes.

2.19 During an incident on the Heathrow Express a Network Rail incident officer will be mobilised to support the IC.

Post Office Railway

2.20 The Post Office Railway, known as Mail Rail, is a 610 mm narrow gauge driverless underground railway. The system is owned and operated by the Post Office. It is fully automated and operates on 37 kilometres of track, with seven stations between Paddington and Whitechapel. The system uses a third rail with power supplies up to 450 volts DC. In 2018 it was turned into a tourist attraction as part of The Postal Museum..

2.21 During an incident the IC is to liaise with the museum staff who will advise on the system..

Croydon Tramlink

2.22 Tramlink is a light rail tram system serving Croydon and surrounding areas in South London. It is owned by London Trams, an arm of TfL and operated by FirstGroup.

2.23 These lines total some 28 km, of which, all but approximately 3km are on segregated rights of way using either redundant railway alignments or new construction. The Tramlink system also runs adjacent to live Network Rail infrastructure

2.24 Control of the system, as well as maintenance and storage of the trams, is located at Therapia Lane Depot which is situated on the Wimbledon route.

2.25 At every incident involving a tram or the infrastructure a suitably qualified member of Tramlink will be mobilised to liaise with the emergency services. The tram driver will be the initial point of liaison.

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Rail tunnels under construction

2.26 London is continually improving its rail infrastructure, with new rail networks and tunnels being added. Some of these projects are national upgrades such as HS2. Others are more local such as the Bank upgrade.

2.27 Once completed, these projects will be handed over to a TOC. During the construction phase they will be managed and controlled by the respective construction companies.

2.28 Due to the nature of these projects and complexities of construction sites it is not possible to cover all eventualities. As a result it is essential that local crews carry out regular inspections and update the MDT as policy 800.

2.29 During an incident the IC needs to recognise that they will potentially receive different levels of support and guidance from the management companies.

3 Pre-Planning

3.1 Station personnel should gather risk information on all rail premises and associated rail networks in accordance with policy 800.

3.2 Particular attention should be paid to:

(a) Size and location of rail stations and their RVP's

(b) Location of ventilation shafts, access shafts and cross passages

(c) Complexity and layout of stations and the associated rail lines

(d) Depths of any shafts and underground lines

(e) Any fixed instillations.

(f) Location and quality of any water supplies

(g) Access to any remote rail lines

(h) The quality of radio communications and any support systems (channel 5)

(i) Type and size of any rolling stock that use the lines

(j) Types of risks in the area (high voltage, points and signals, cylinders)

(k) Emergency procedures carried out by station or rail staff.

The list is not exhaustive

4 Hazards & control measures

4.1 There will be common hazards associated with rail networks and rolling stock. There will also be hazards that are specific to particular networks, it is important that firefighters recognise the types of hazards associated with the risks.

4.2 The below information highlights some of the key hazards that will be faced. Due to the varied environments and incidents types that could be encountered, it is important that the IC carries out a Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) as policy 342.

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Access/Location

4.3 Access to the rail network is likely to pose significant difficulty. This could be either due to long travel distances, access through shafts or uneven ground on surface rail.

4.4 Stations will often have complex layouts when servicing a number of platforms / lines.

Movement of trains

4.5 There are many risks that rolling stock present, these include:

(a) Being struck by train

(b) Dragged towards a moving train due to air turbulence

(c) Bridging 'live' and 'isolated' track causing re-energisation.

Variety of rolling stock

4.6 There is a variety of rolling stock in use across the rail network and there can be an expectation of different rolling stock being present on the same line. For example the London underground ground has various passenger trains that vary in size and types, including the driverless train situated on the DLR.

4.7 The varying methods of powering rolling stock pose risks that the IC must consider if involved in an incident. The method of powering includes diesel, electricity, combination of both and steam.

Transport of hazardous material

4.8 Everything from farm animals up to nuclear materials is regularly transported by rail. In normal circumstances this is perfectly safe. When involved in an incident these materials can provide an additional hazard to both crews and general public.

4.9 If you suspect that hazardous material is involved, crews will need to consider policy 796 "HAZMATS; Fires and incidents involving hazardous substances".

Electrical power supplies

4.10 Each network has different methods of supplying power to the rolling stock. These include third & fourth rail system, overhead line equipment, or individual power supplies within the rolling stock.

4.11 These power supplies can be AC or DC currents and will vary in voltage from 450 up to 1500 volts. In some of the substations supplying the various networks these voltages can be substantially higher.

4.12 If you suspect that an electrical supply is involved crews will need to consider policy 769 incidents involving electricity

Third and fourth rail

4.13 The third rail traction system utilises a conductor rail operating at a nominal voltage of 750 volts direct current in most areas. A 'pick up shoe' on the train conducts the electrical current from the rail to the motor of the train. Some shoes are interconnected and can be live even if they are not touching the conductor rail. The return circuit is normally provided by the axles and wheels.

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Anything touching the line, including firefighting media, flood water or parts of the rail vehicle should always be regarded as live for both third and fourth rail systems, until assurance has been provided by a competent qualified person.

4.14 Before any person goes on to tracks where a third or fourth rail system operates the power needs to be isolated and earthed. This needs to be confirmed back to control (See section Power isolation)

4.15 A cross section of fourth rail system



Overhead Line Equipment (OLE)

4.16 OLE power can be provided for alternating current or direct current rail vehicles. Consisting of a live contact bar or wire suspended by a catenary wire, this is supported by a complex system of suspension cables, arms and tension devices.



4.17 The rail vehicle will have a pantograph on top to collect traction power. This will make contact with the live bar or wire, and will therefore also be 'live'.

4.18 If crews need to isolate power to the train this can be accomplished by getting the competent qualified person to lower the pantograph cutting off the power supply to the train (See section 7.18). The IC will still need to get power isolated if there is also a third/fourth rail system.

4.19 Trains that draw their power from OLE will have a **Warning Line**, which is a line applied to rail vehicles, that is clearly visible when viewed from rail level and from platform height. This is to allow staff working at these levels to see the safe limits for working when a traction & rolling stock vehicle is under OLE

4.20 The warning line is normally painted orange, unless this contrasts with the TOC livery, in which case it may be either white or black, whichever gives the greater contrast.

4.21 It is safe for crews to carry out any work on the train as long as they remain below this line. This includes the deployment of ladders, as long as the head of the ladder and anyone on it, remain below the line.

4.22 OLE Warning Line:



5 En Route

5.1 Rail incidents can be located in remote, rural, built up urban areas, above or below ground comprising of simple or complex infrastructure. To counter this and to assist with pre-planning and risk management on arrival, it is essential that the IC makes every effort to identify the precise location and appropriate access points to the incident.

5.2 The IC may use a variety of information sources to inform this decision making:

- local pre-planning information
- mobilising information
- information from infrastructure managers
- local risk information
- on-site information provided for fire and rescue service use (premises information boxes)
- local knowledge of crews/topography
- signal number
- bridge number

- overhead line support number
- quarter-mile post at the track side
- station names
- significant geographical features
- point number
- local mapping systems (such as Ordinance Survey maps and 'six figure grid reference')
- nearest road or intersection

This list is not exhaustive.

6 On arrival

6.1 On arrival tactics, will at all times be supported by safe systems of work and concise briefings following a DRA so that a plan can be developed to deal with the incident.

6.2 The generic key roles of the LFB at rail incidents are:

- Save life and carry out rescues.
- Fight and prevent fires.
- Manage hazardous materials and protect the environment.
- Mitigate the effects of the incident.
- Ensure the health and safety of fire service personnel, other category 1 & 2 responders and the public
- Safety management within the inner cordon.

7 Operating procedures

7.1 When attending incidents on rail systems, the IC should consider the following:

- Early liaison with a responsible member of infrastructure staff.
- Liaison with other emergency services in attendance (British Transport Police, London Ambulance Service).
- Power isolation. Remember, unless earthed, conductors may hold residual charge, always assume the power supply is 'live' unless confirmed otherwise.
- Confirm if trains are running under caution (see 7.3) or stopped.
- Early consideration of the requirement to use breathing apparatus.
- Committing a reconnaissance team and deployment of safety officers/sector commanders.
- The use of station plans and station control room.
- Consider the use of secondary access routes and intervention points.
- Assess water supplies.
- Assess suitability/ functionality of fixed installation systems.
- Consider the use of ventilation systems.
- Consider the use of communication links, CCTV and public address systems and leaky feeder.

7.2 The IC should carry out a DRA to consider whether:

- It is safe to work on or near the track with the traction current left on.
- It is safe to work near to the track with the trains running under caution.
- It is safe to work on the track or train with just the pantograph lowered.
- It is safe for trains on adjacent lines to continue to run under caution.
- Diesel trains need to be stopped as they will be unaffected by an isolation of the traction current.

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- The traction current needs to be isolated.
- Trains need to be stopped.

7.3 The term "trains run under caution" means that the driver is warned that personnel are on the track and they must proceed at a speed which will enable them to safely stop the train if necessary. Whilst running under caution, trains can run up to a maximum of 50 mph.

7.4 There may be circumstances where, after carrying out a DRA, it may be of benefit to monitor minor incidents e.g. let a small trackside fire burn out so as to not impact business continuity of the rail infrastructure. However, in the event of a genuine threat to the safety of the public, fire crews or infrastructure, power isolation and or train stoppages will be expected to be initiated as quickly as possible.

Brigade safety officer/lookouts

7.5 Whenever brigade personnel are working near or on rail infrastructure the IC will need to deploy safety officers with an appropriate brief.

7.6 There will be occasions were lookouts are needed. Infrastructure staff receive extensive training and continued assessment of their competence as lookouts and the IC should utilise their skills where necessary.

7.7 On occasions where infrastructure staff are not available the IC will need to make sure that any brigade staff carrying out the role of lookout needs to be aware of the following:

- Clear and concise briefing which includes lines of communication and emergency actions to be taken.
- They are in possession of a hand held radio on a dedicated channel, an Acme Thunderer whistle and a working hand lamp.
- Remain in constant contact with designated safety officers responsible for the crews working on the track.
- Position themselves to give crews working on or near the lines maximum warning. This will also give approaching trains as much stopping distance as possible. See 7.9
- Inform the IC/designated safety officer of their distance and location in relation to the incident or agree distances before taking up position.
- Lookouts must not reposition without informing the IC/designated safety officer.
- Stand in a position of safety facing the direction of approaching trains and remain vigilant at all times.
- Must be at a minimum of 3m away from any passing train.

7.8 Whenever lookouts are deployed the IC will need to deploy a dedicated safety officer. The role of this safety officer is to stay in constant contact with the lookout, whilst being in close proximately to the crews working in the hazard area. This is to prevent any delay in the crews being informed of any approaching train.

7.9 As well as warning crews of approaching trains lookouts are to warn approaching train drivers that personnel are on the line. This is done by:

- In daylight hold both arms straight above the head
- At night by waving a bright light violently from side to side in the direction of the approaching train.

7.10 The distance that the lookout is going to stand from the incident is going to vary greatly dependant on a number of factors such as:

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- Speed of which the trains are likely to be traveling
- The time it will take crews to get themselves and any equipment to safety
- Is the track straight allowing the lookout a greater line of sight or are there bends
- The weather conditions
- Visibility.

7.11 When deploying lookout the IC need to be aware that at 140mph a train will travel 1.9km in 30 seconds. At 50mph (maximum speed when running at caution) a train will still travel nearly 500m in 30 seconds. The IC needs to give the lookout enough time to communicate of the approaching train and then crews to get out of the way.

Power isolation and trains stopped.

7.12 There are two accepted methods of confirming power off and all trains stopped:

7.13 Where a 'Competent Qualified Person' is present at the scene – such as a LUL Station Supervisor, railway Station Manager, Network Incident Response Manager (NIRM) or RIO – a request should be made directly to that person. A 'priority' message must then be sent to Control giving the name and role of the person and time power is confirmed off. As soon as the competent qualified person confirms power off (SCD are deployed on fourth rail systems) and all trains stopped, crews can go trackside and not wait for the message to be sent to Control, as this could delay life saving actions.

7.14 If a competent qualified person is not available, the IC must send a priority message to Control requesting power to be isolated between two known locations and trains stopped. This must be confirmed back. Only the named officer of the Brigade and the rail controller who agreed traction current isolation can agree the restoration of the traction current.

7.15 The precise reasons for power isolation or trains stopped must be sent as part of the priority message to Control.

7.16 ICs need to be aware that the isolation of power supplies and the stopping of trains other than at station platforms, can have serious implications away from the immediate scene of operations including:

- Passengers alighting from trains that have stopped outside stations and walking along tracks which may still be in use or live.
- Overcrowding of stations and platforms.
- Physical and mental distress of passengers on trains in tunnels.
- Widespread disruption to train services.

7.17 The decision to isolate power or stop trains should not be taken lightly and the consequences of these measures affecting other parts of the rail infrastructure should be regularly evaluated as part of the DRA, so disruption is kept to a minimum.

7.18 Trains that are powered from over head power lines can be isolated be just lowering the pantograph. This will prevent the need for wider isolation of power as the overhead line equipment can remain energised.

7.19 Alternative methods of isolating the power on the London underground have previously been taught to Firefighters. These methods are no longer acceptable and could result in the power being re-energised without warning.

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7.20 In the case of depots and sidings the IC is to identify the person responsible for power isolation and train movements. Once the IC is satisfied that it is safe for Brigade operations to commence they are to inform Brigade Control.

7.21 IC need to be aware that when a message for all trains stopped and power off has been confirmed the network can still be energised with trains moving. This is due to the fact that trains can bridge isolated and live points resulting in sections becoming re-energised. Trains can travel for considerable distance without power or might have already passed stop signs resulting in them being unaware of the incident.

7.22 Overhead power lines will remain energised even after power has been isolated until they are earthed which can take some time.

Short-Circuiting device

7.23 On third rail, DLR and LUL systems SCD are designed to earth sections of track allowing crews to work safely. They should always be used as a pair with one being placed either side of the incident working area, creating a safe zone.

7.24 SCD should be deployed by rail operator personnel, in their absence SCD trained FRU crew may place them on the track in an emergency. SCD can be found in train driving cabs and on station premises. ICs are to be aware that twin track configurations may require SCD to be placed on to the non incident line in order to provide a safe working environment for emergency service personnel.

7.25 When operations are complete under no circumstances should SCD that have been placed on the track be removed by Brigade personnel.



Competent Qualified Person

7.26 With each type of rail infrastructure their will be a competent qualified person that will be able to assist and advice the IC.

7.27 At incidents on the LUL a station supervisor will be available at the RVP to act as the competent qualified person. The station supervisor will have received training on liaising with the emergency services and our procedures. As a result they will be able to better support the IC by advising on the network, isolating power, act as a liaison link with the LU ERU (See chapter 7.39)

7.28 The LU Supervisor will be wearing a white tabard stating "Station Supervisor" on it.

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7.29 NR will mobilise a RIO to all incidents affecting the NR infrastructure; their role is to liaise with and advise the IC on safety issues relating to Brigade personnel working on/or adjacent to the permanent way.

Emergency Response Unit (ERU)

7.30 TfL have an emergency response capability and will mobilise to track related incidents on the LUL and Overground. The ERU has a blue light response capability and is likely to arrive at the early stages of an incident.

7.31 The ERU crew consists of LUL engineers who have a detailed knowledge of track related incident response. They will also normally ride with a BTP officer as a driver.

7.32 ERU crews can provide tactical advice to the IC when formulating a plan to safely resolve an incident. During an incident the ERU can be used to support the IC's tactical plan.

7.33 ICs have to be aware that they are responsible for the safety of all those within the inner cordon, this includes the ERU crew.

Communication

7.34 All LUL sub surface stations have a permanently live UHF channel 5 radio base station system installed. This system is designed to provide effective fire ground radio coverage throughout the station, and tunnels, including the rendezvous point/s and entrances to which an attendance is made. It allows communication between two or more hand held fire ground radios when switched to channel 5.

7.35 NR has facilities to allow communications to be achieved between Brigade personnel, rail personnel or to advise passengers. These include:

- Signal Post Telephones (SPT). (NR).

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- OLE gantry telephones (NR)
- Public address systems. (LUL/NR).

7.36 Trackside telephones are indicated by a red telephone on a white background marked with the word 'ELECTRIFICATION' and are connected directly to the rail operator's control. The ringing button must be operated for at least 4 seconds.

7.37 Signal post telephones are marked with diagonal black and white stripes and are connected to the signal box.



8 References

8.1 The following policies are relevant to and should be read in conjunction with this policy:

- Policy number 238 – Incident command procedure
- Policy number 342 – Dynamic Risk Assessment
- Policy number 412 – Mobilising policy
- Policy number 434 –Sectorisation at incidents
- Policy number 518 – Messages from incidents
- Policy number 800 – Management of operational risk information
- Policy number 828 – Recording decisions at incidents
- Policy number769 – Incident involving electricity
- Policy number 871 – Incidents in tunnels
- Policy number 796 – HAZMATS; fires and incidents involving hazardous substances
- Fire service act 2004

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Appendix 1 – Key point summary

Information on task or event

- Liaise with competent qualified person on site.
- Location and size of fire in relation to railway.
- MDT
- Premise information box
- Life risk
- Access/location.

Information about resources

- PDA.
- Competent qualified person
- British Transport Police.
- LAS.
- ERU

Information about risk and benefit

- Do trains need to be stopped or can they run at caution
- The traction current needs to be isolated.
- Movement of trains.
- Speed of trains & air turbulence.
- Electrical power supplies and/or high voltage power cables.
- Uneven surfaces and tripping.
- Type of power supply

Gathering and thinking

Objectives

- Save life.
- Extinguish fire.
- Protect the environment.
- Minimise business disruption.

Communicating

- Consider JESIP principles.
- Liaise with representative/responsible person from respective railway company.
- Ensure communications are established and maintained between, LFB, Control and railway representative.
- Where subsurface leaky feeders exist test and secure channel 5.
- Dedicated channel for safety officer
- Use of PA systems on trains and in stations.
- Signal post, OLE gantry and trackside telephones.
-

Controlling

- Establish and maintain scene safety.
- Ensure track current is isolated if working on or near permanent way.
- Use lookouts and safety officers.

Plan

- Carry out a DRA to establish track isolation, trains stopped or trains running under caution.
- Consider the wider network impact of stopping trains and isolating traction power.
- Crews should be kept to a minimum.
- Secure a safe access route for emergency responders as well as evacuating members of public
- Consider specialist advice e.g. qualified competent person or ERU.
- SCD to be deployed on fourth rail systems.
- Consider the early deployment of lookouts and safety officers.

Document history

Assessments

An equality, sustainability or health, safety and welfare impact assessment and/or a risk assessment was last completed on:

EIA		SDIA		HSWIA		RA	

Audit trail

Listed below is a brief audit trail, detailing amendments made to this policy/procedure.

Page/para nos.	Brief description of change	Date

Subject list

You can find this policy under the following subjects.

Freedom of Information Act exemptions

This policy/procedure has been securely marked due to:

Considered by: (responsible work team)	**FOIA exemption**	**Security marking classification**

DRAFT

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Full Equality Impact Assessment Template

Name of Policy and Reference Number (if available):
Railway Policy No 316
Purpose of Policy:
A full re-write of railway policy to bring the procedures up to date in supporting LFB crews in dealing with incidents on railways.
What is the impact (negative, positive or neutral) on the equality groups?
Neutral
What is the evidence or other information in support of this?
The updated policy details how to respond to operational incidents on any rail network. None of the amendments make an impact on any equality group.
Who did you consult, and what was their response?
The following groups were consulted as part of this process: • Departmental • Representative Bodies • Heads of service. No responses were received in relation to equalities.
What changes have been identified as a result?
No changes that that had an equality impact were requested.
How will these changes be implemented?
Not applicable

Date to be reviewed by: ……

Signed: …… **Date:** ……

(Please list any documentation supporting this EIA)